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ADMIRALTY - DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT -
DOHSA preempts application of substantive state law to
wrongful death actions arising from deaths occurring on
the high seas; but allows state courts to entertain DOHSA
actions while applying the substantive rules of the Act.
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986).
James Tallentire and Michael Taylor worked on fixed
drilling platforms off the coast of Louisiana.' On August
6, 1980, both men were killed in a helicopter crash ap-
proximately 35 miles offshore while being transported
from a platform to Houma, Louisiana.2 The helicopter
was owned and operated by Air Logistics, Inc.3
The wives of both men filed separate wrongful death
actions in federal district court4 against Offshore Logis-
tics5 raising claims under the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), 6 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OC-
I Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1986).
Id. The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), the federal wrongful death
statute for deaths on the high seas, provides a three mile limit in defining the
extent of state territorial waters. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982). See infra note 41 for the
relevant text of section 761. Since the crash occurred beyond this limit, the crash
occurred on the "high seas" for purposes of DOHSA.
Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2488. Air Logistics, Inc. is a division of Offshore Logis-
tics, Inc. Id.
Plaintiff Tallentire initially filed her action in the Western District of Louisiana
while Plaintiff Taylor filed her action in the Eastern District of Louisiana. These
actions were later consolidated in the Eastern District. Id.
5 Id. The helicopter manufacturer, Bell Helicopter Textron, was initially a de-
fendant in both plaintiffs' actions. However, the plaintiffs failed to introduce suffi-
cient evidence of Bell's liability, and the district court entered judgment in Bell's
favor. Neither party appealed that judgment. Id.
,i 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982). DOHSA provides a right of action to the per-
sonal representative of the spouse, parent, child, or dependent relative of any
person killed on the high seas against the vessel, person, or corporation liable for
the death. The death must be caused by a wrongful act on the high seas beyond a
marine league, or three miles, from the shore of any state, the District of Colum-
bia, or the territories or dependencies of the United States. M. NORRIS, THE LAw
OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 136 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter MARITIME PER-
SONAL INJURIES].
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SLA),7 and the Louisiana wrongful death statute.8 The
district court held DOHSA provides the exclusive wrong-
ful death remedy for non-seaman deaths which occur on
the high seas and accordingly dismissed the OCSLA and
state claims. 9 This ruling effectively denied plaintiffs re-
covery for non-pecuniary damages because DOHSA pro-
vides only for pecuniary losses.' ° Accordingly, the trial
court award was limited to pecuniary damages.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of
the OCSLA and state claims.' 2 The plaintiffs argued that
the Louisiana wrongful death statute applied to the crash
on the high seas in either of two ways: one, through its
own force because its applicability is preserved in section
7 of DOHSA' 3 or, two, as a surrogate federal law acting
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982). OCSLA provides a tort remedy to persons
injured or killed on "the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and
artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon." See id. § 1333(2)(A) which
provides in relevant part:
(2)(A) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent
with this subchapter or other Federal laws and regulations of the
Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal
laws of each adjacent State ... are hereby declared to be the law of
the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures er-
ected thereon ....
Id. In short, a personal injury action involving events occurring on artificial is-
lands, fixed structures, etc. such as drilling platforms is governed by federal law,
the content of which is borrowed from the law of the adjacent state. See Gulf
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 481 (1981).
8 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1986).
9 Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2488.
10 Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1982)). Section 2 of DOHSA (later codified as
46 U.S.C. § 762) provides:
The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for
the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit
is brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in
proportion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of
the death of the person by whose representative the suit is brought.
Id. (emphasis added).
11 Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2488.
12 Id.
ui 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982). Section 7 of DOHSA (later codified as 46 U.S.C.
§ 767) provides:
The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of ac-
tion or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter. Nor
shall this chapter apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within
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through OCSLA. t4 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's refusal to
allow Louisiana law to supplement the DOHSA cause of
action.' 5 The court of appeals first rejected OCSLA's ap-
plicability to the action.1 6 However, the court held "[t]he
plain words of section 7 of DOHSA prevent the preemp-
tion by DOHSA of the Louisiana state death act."' 7 The
court of appeals noted further that a literal interpretation
of a statute is controlling unless the legislative history
clearly expresses a contrary intent.' 8 The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari' 9 to prevent a pos-
sible "disunity in administration of wrongful death reme-
dies" and because the court of appeals decision conflicted
"with the prevailing view in other courts that DOHSA
preempts state law wrongful death statutes in the area of
its operation. ' 20  Held, reversed and remanded: DOHSA
the territorial limits of any State, or to any navigable waters in the
Panama Canal Zone.
ld.
4 See supra note 7 for a discussion of OCSLA.
15 Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd,
106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986). Judge Davis wrote the opinion for the court. Judge Jolly
concurred commenting that the result of the court's decision "may create a mess
in more than a few cases." Id. at 1289. Judge Garza dissented stating that he
believed the legislative history of DOHSA indicates section 7 was intended only to
preserve existing state law remedies for deaths on territorial waters. Id.
- See id. at 1279. "OCSLA adopts state laws as surrogate federal law only 'to
the extent that [the state laws] are . . . not inconsistent with . . . other federal
laws'...."Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1982))(emphasis original). Be-
cause the non-pecuniary measure of damages provided by the Louisiana wrongful
death statute substantially conflicted with the pecuniary damage provisions of
DOHSA, the court concluded it could not apply Louisiana law through OCSLA.
See id.
17 Id. at 1288. See supra note 13 for the full text of section 7.
18 Tallentire, 754 F.2d at 1282. After examining the legislative history of section
7, the court of appeals concluded it was "hopeless" to discern any clearly defined
legislative intent sufficient to overturn the literal interpretation. Id. at 1279-84.
For a discussion of the legislative history of section 7, see infra notes 79-85 and
accompanying text.
- Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
2o Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2489. For an examination of the circuit court treat-
ment of this issue, compare Tallentire, 754 F.2d at 1274 (holding that section 7 of
DOHSA prevents preemption of state wrongful death statutes), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
2485 (1986) with Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that DOHSA preempts application of state wrongful death statutes to
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preempts application of substantive state law to wrongful
death actions arising from deaths occurring on the high
seas; but allows state courts to entertain DOHSA actions
while applying the substantive rules of the Act. Offshore Lo-
gistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Prelude to DOHSA
The jurisprudence surrounding maritime wrongful
death traces back to the Supreme Court's 1886 decision in
The Harrisburg.2' In The Harrisburg, the Court held no
wrongful death action exists under general maritime
law.22 Observing the general common law did not pro-
vide for a wrongful death remedy, 23 the Court refused to
conversely create such a remedy under maritime common
law.24 If no statutory remedy applied to a given action,
the common law thus granted no remedy whatsover to the
wrongful death plaintiff.25 Therefore, The Harrisburg re-
quired that a plaintiff look to a federal or state wrongful
deaths on the high seas). See also Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir.
1974). In Barbe, the court of appeals stated in dicta that the "better authority"
rejects the view that section 7 allows state wrongful death statutes to operate on
the high seas. Id. at 801 n.10. For a discussion of the case authority regarding the
preemption issue, see infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
21 119 U.S. 199 (1886). Prior to The Harrisburg, the Court had recognized the
power of the state to confer a wrongful death remedy for maritime deaths occur-
ring on its territorial waters. See Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); American
Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872).
' The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199.
2. Id. at 204 (citing Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 756 (1878) ("[B]y the
common law no civil action lies for an injury which results in . . . death.")).
24 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. at 213. Rather than analyze the justification for the
common law rule, the Court noted:
[W]e know of no country that has adopted a different rule on this
subject for the sea from that which it maintains on the land. ...
Since, however, it is now established that [no wrongful death remedy
exists] in the absence of a statute giving the right, and it has not
been shown that the maritime law .... generally, has established a
different rule [in admiralty from the rule at common law], we are
forced to the conclusion that no such action will lie in the courts of
the United States under the general maritime law.
Id.
25 Id.
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death statute for a right of action. 6 Accordingly, lower
courts examined state and foreign statutes to determine
whether they afforded a wrongful death remedy.27 This
practice regarding deaths on territorial waters was explic-
itly upheld by the Supreme Court in Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia.28
It is almost intuitive that courts should apply state death
acts to territorial waters. However, it is not so plain that
state acts should extraterritorially apply to the high seas.
Nevertheless, in The Hamilton,2 9 the Supreme Court sanc-
tioned the application of state wrongful death statutes to
deaths on the high seas. 30 The Court held that Delaware's
wrongful death statute applied to the action arising from
an accident between two Delaware ships, even though it
occurred on the high seas. 3 1 In that case, the court en-
26 See Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 555 (1889). The
Harrisburg Court declined to apply any relevant state wrongful death statute be-
cause the statute of limitations had expired. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. at 214.
27 See, e.g., The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 103-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) (applying
state wrongful death statute to maritime death in territorial waters), aff'd, 61 F.
364 (2d Cir. 1894) (allowing application of state wrongful death statute to acci-
dent in state territorial waters in the absence of federal regulations).
28 257 U.S. 233 (1921). The Court cited Chase and Sherlock, see supra note 21, in
support of the decision. Id. at 240-41. Earlier, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205 (1917), the Court emphasized the importance of uniformity in mari-
time law by stating:
[No state] legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose
expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international
and interstate relations. This limitation at the least is essential to the
effective operation of the fundamental purposes for which such law
was incorporated into our national laws by the Constitution itself.
Id. at 216. Jensen has subsequently been recognized as the father of the uniform-
ity concept in the field of admiralty. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588,
594 (1959). The Garcia Court believed applying state statutes to territorial waters
did not violate this principle because of the local nature of such waters. Garcia,
257 U.S. at 242.
21, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
3o Id. at 405. In The Hamilton, several persons were drowned when two Delaware
ships collided. Id. at 402. Plaintiffs attempted to recover for the deaths under the
Delaware wrongful death statute. Id. at 402-03. The issue, as framed by Justice
Holmes, was "whether the Delaware statute applies to a claim for death on the
high seas, arising purely from tort, in proceedings in admiralty." Id. at 403.
31 Id. at 405.
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dorsed the power of a state to confer a remedy for deaths
occurring on the high seas. 2
Although application of state law avoided the harsh
Harrisburg rule that no remedy exists at common law, it
was not an ideal solution. The Courts were often
presented with exceedingly difficult conflict of law
problems, especially when an action arose from a collision
between vessels incorporated in different states or be-
tween an American-flag vessel and one flying the flag of a
foreign country. 3 Typically, a court had to ascertain the
existence of a state or foreign (for a foreign flag vessel)
wrongful death statute.34 If a statute did exist, the court
had to determine whether the statute purported to cover
maritime accidents and, if so, whether the statute pur-
ported to apply to those state residents or state vessels
outside the state boundaries. 35 Finally, the court had to
decide which law to apply to the case if more than one
possibility existed. 36 Of course, the validity of any stat-
ute's application depended on the extent of the particular
32 Id. at 403. However, it is not clear upon what theory the Supreme Court
based its application of Delaware law to the high seas. The court of appeals based
its application on the theory that a Delaware ship on the high seas is "in contem-
plation of law, within the territory of that state." The Hamilton, 146 F. 724, 726 (2d
Cir. 1906), aft'd, 207 U.S. 298 (1907). However, the Supreme Court seemed to
base its conclusion on the theory that Delaware may exercise authority over its
own corporations or citizens as a matter of personal jurisdiction. See The Hamilton,
207 U.S. at 403. See also Magruder & Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty
Jurisdiction, 35 YALE L.J. 395, 409-11 (1926).
-1 See, e.g., The Sagamore, 247 F. 743 (1st Cir. 1917) (Massachusetts schooner
and British steamer); TheJames McGee, 300 F. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (United States
owned vessel and NewJersey vessel); The Middlesex, 253 F. 142 (D. Mass. 1916)
(New Jersey owned and Massachusetts based steamer colliding with Maine
schooner). The Middlesex court was so perplexed, recovery was denied under all
of three possible statutes. The Middlesex, 253 F. at 146. See generally Magruder &
Grout, supra note 32, at 409-18 for a discussion of extraterritorial application of
state death acts.
34 Edleman, The Tallentire Case: The Fifth Circuit Extends Recoveries for Death on the
High Seas, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 375, 376 (1986).
45 Id.
-- Id. at 376-77 (citing The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907) (applying the law of
the vessel's domicile); La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95 (1908) (applying French law);
The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885) (holding that, where the vessels are of dif-
ferent countries, the law of the forum can be applied); The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24
(1881) (applying U.S. law)).
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state's legislative jurisdiction over the matter. 7
At this point, it was clear that the labyrinth of common
law and state statutes was an unsatisfactory vehicle for
providing a maritime wrongful death remedy. 8 It was
equally clear that this vehicle did little to promote the uni-
formity objectives espoused by the Supreme Court. 9
B. DOHSA and Its Aftermath
The inequities and confusion often resulting from the
absence of any general maritime or federal wrongful
death remedy eventually led Congress to enact the Death
on the High Seas Act in 1920.40 DOHSA invalidated ap-
plication of the Harrisburg rule to the high seas by provid-
ing a federal wrongful death remedy for the death of any
person caused by any "wrongful act" occurring on the
high seas.4 '
37 See Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 88 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
Legislative jurisdiction is the power of a governmental body to create or affect
legal interests through application of its laws. See generally Reese, Legislative Juris-
diction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978). Regarding legislative jurisdiction at sea,
the Wilson court stated:
Legislative jurisdiction to impose a liability for a wrongful act at sea
beyond the boundaries of the state had to rest upon one of two theo-
ries: Either (1) that the vessel upon which the wrongful act occurred
was constructively part of the territory of the state; or (2) that the
wrongdoer was a vessel or citizen of the state subject to its jurisdic-
tion even when beyond its territorial limits.
Wilson, 121 F. Supp. at 88.
18 See Day, Maritime Wrongful Death and Survival Recovery: The Need for Legislative
Reform, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 648, 650-51 (1964); see also Magruder & Grout, supra
note 32, at 409-18 (discussing extraterritorial application of state death acts).
s SeeJensen, 244 U.S. at 216. See supra note 28 for a discussion ofJensen.
4o 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982).
41 See Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 394-97 (1970); 46
U.S.C. § 761 (1982). Section 761, defining the right of action as well as by whom
and where the action may be brought, provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas . . . . the personal
representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages ...
in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, hus-
band, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person,
or corporation which would have been liable if death had not
ensued.
46 U.S.C. § 761. Section 762 limits damages recoverable under the statute to
"fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained" by the beneficiaries
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While DOHSA provided a remedy for wrongful deaths
on the high seas, state law was the exclusive remedy for
non-seaman deaths occurring on territorial waters, 4 2 be-
cause no general maritime wrongful death remedy ex-
isted.43 Thus, if no state statute applied, there was a
complete absence of remedies in keeping with The
Harrisburg.44
1. Reversing The Harrisburg - Moragne
The Supreme Court examined the wisdom of this ab-
sence in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.45 In Moragne,
the Court overruled the The Harrisburg by holding that an
action for wrongful death lies under general maritime law
for death caused by violation of maritime duties.46 The
Court first observed that the Harrisburg rule had no justifi-
cation in the modern world,4 and that the federal and
of the decedent. Id. § 762. See supra note 10 for the full text of section 2. That
same year, Congress additionally enacted the Jones Act. Id. § 688. TheJones Act,
by extending to "seamen" the protections of the Federal Employers Liability Act,
provided a right of recovery of pecuniary losses against their employers for negli-
gence resulting in injury or death, regardless of where the negligence occurs. Ker-
nan v. American Dredging Co., 335 U.S. 426, 429 (1958).
42 See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). Since the Jones Act provided a remedy to
seamen regardless of the situs of the accident, that act provided a remedy to
seamen on both territorial waters and the high seas. See supra note 41 for a discus-
sion of the Jones Act. As for non-seamen, DOHSA is unavailable for deaths oc-
curring on territorial waters because its application is explicitly restricted to
wrongful acts occurring on the high seas. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982).
43 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. at 199.
44 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of The
Harrisburg.
4, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
411 Id. at 409. In Moragne, a longshoreman was killed while working aboard a
ship in Florida territorial waters. Id. at 376. His widow sued the owner of the
vessel for wrongful death based on theories of negligence and unseaworthiness.
Id. The United States district court dismissed the unseaworthiness claim after the
Florida Supreme Court certified that no cause of action for unseaworthiness exists
under Florida law. Id. at 376-77. The United States Supreme Court, relying on
the Harrisburg rule that there is no general maritime cause of action for wrongful
death, had previously held that there is no federal cause of action for unseaworthi-
ness. The Tungas v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). Since neither Florida law,
the applicable state law, nor the general maritime law allowed a cause of action for
unseaworthiness, the court of appeals dismissed that claim. Moragne, 398 U.S. at
376-77.
47 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 379-88. The Court stated that legal historians have con-
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state legislatures had evinced no policy against allowing
recovery for wrongful death.48  In reaching that conclu-
sion, the Court noted that even the Harrisburg Court did
not attempt to justify its result beyond blind adherence to
the old common law rule. 49 The Court concluded that no
countervailing considerations overshadowed the hardship
imposed by the absence of a general maritime wrongful
death remedy when no state remedy was available.50 In
overruling The Harrisburg, the Court recited arguments
presented by the United States, participating as amicus cu-
riae, that DOHSA should be the primary guide in fashion-
cluded that the only substantial basis for the old common law rule was the long
obsolete felony-merger doctrine. Id. at 382. Under that doctrine, the tort was
preempted by the offense against the Crown. Smith v. Sykes, 89 Eng. Rep. 61
(K.B. 1677); Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1606). Under the feudal
law system, the goods and estate of the felon were forfeited to the Crown leaving
nothing to satisfy a private demand. M. NORRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 29.1 n. 1
(4th ed. 1985) [hereinafter THE LAW OF SEAMEN]. Other reasons advanced to jus-
tify the old rule included the beliefs that human life transcended monetary valua-
tion and that an injury which resulted in death was a public injury thereby
excluding private redress. Id.
48 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 388-93. The Court specifically cited the existence of a
wrongful death statute in all 50 states and of several federal wrongful death stat-
utes. Id. at 390.
49 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393-405. The Court described three anomalies
presented by the present situation. First, wrongful conduct on the high seas cre-
ating an injury results in liability, but none where the same conduct causes death.
Id. at 395. Second, breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship outside the
three mile limit provided by DOHSA produce liability under that statute, while
none follows within the territorial waters of a state whose local statute excludes
unseaworthiness claims. Id. Third, a "true seaman" covered by the Jones Act,
supra note 41, has no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territo-
rial waters, while a longshoreman does have such a remedy when provided by a
state statute. (The Court held in Gillispie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S.
148 (1964) that the Jones Act preempts state wrongful death statutes on territorial
waters). Id. at 395-96.
The Court also concluded that Congress, when it enacted DOHSA, did not in-
tend to preclude application of a federal remedy to territorial waters when it ex-
cluded territorial waters from DOHSA's jurisdiction. See id. at 397-98; see also 46
U.S.C. § 761 (1982) (Section 1 of DOHSA limiting that statute's application to
wrongful acts occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league, or three miles,
from shore).
.5 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403-05. Specifically, the Court concluded that the prin-
ciple of stare decisis did not militate against overruling The Harrisburg. Id. The
Court stated, "We do not regard the rule of The Harrisburg as a closely arguable
proposition .... The rule has had a long opportunity to prove its acceptability,
and instead has suffered universal criticism and wide repudiation." Id. at 404.
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ing the elements of the new cause of action created in
Moragne.5t However, the Court withheld judgment on
that issue by stating that "its final resolution should await
further sifting through the lower courts in future
litigation." 52
2. Damages under Moragne
One issue left open in Moragne was the measure of dam-
ages - specifically, whether damages under such a claim
must be limited to the pecuniary standard of DOHSA and
the Jones Act.53 In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,54 the
Court took an expansive view of the damages issue, hold-
ing that plaintiffs bringing a Moragne wrongful death ac-
tion may recover, in addition to pecuniary damages,
certain non-pecuniary damages not available under
DOHSA. 55 The Court conceded that its decision was in-
consistent with the pecuniary damages standard of
DOHSA. 6 However, it further noted that Congress has
• ' Id. at 407-08.
52 Id. at 408. Regarding the elements of the new cause of action, the Court
stated further: "If still other subsidiary issues should require resolution, such as
particular questions of the measure of damages, the courts will not be without
persuasive analogy for guidance. Both the Death on the High Seas Act and the
numerous state wrongful-death acts have been implemented with success for de-
cades." Id.
s See supra notes 10 and 41 for a discussion of DOHSA and the Jones Act,
respectively, and their standard of recovery.
54 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
-5 Id. at 584. The Court specifically held that funeral expenses as well as loss of
support, services, and society were recoverable. Id. at 584, 591. Writing for the
5-4 majority, Justice Brennan stated that loss of society "embraces a broad range
of mutual benefits ... including love, affection, care, attention, companionship,
comfort, and protection." Id. at 585. DOHSA has been interpreted to exclude
recovery for loss of society. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Greenwich v. National
Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961); Mid-
dleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 577
(1934). There is a conflict over whether funeral expenses are compensable under
DOHSA. Compare The Culberson, 61 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1932) (funeral expenses
not part of pecuniary loss) with Moore v. O/S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Tex.
1963) (allowing funeral expenses), aff'd sub nom per curiam, Wilhelm Seafoods, Inc.
v. Moore, 328 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1964).
5- Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 588 n.22. "We recognize, of course, that our decision
permits recovery not generally available under the Death on the High Seas Act.
Traditiofially, however, 'Congress has largely left to this court the responsibility
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given the courts wide discretion in fashioning the control-
ling rules of admiralty.57 Given that discretion, the Court
concluded it had the authority to allow non-pecuniary
damages because, in the Court's view, nothing in
DOHSA's legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended to preclude the Court from fashioning non-statu-
tory remedies which the Court deemed appropriate to
effectuate the policies of the general maritime law.5 8 The
Court cited two bases for its conclusion that permitting
recovery for loss of society furthers the policies of admi-
ralty. 59 First, the Court noted that a "clear majority" of
states permit such a recovery.6 ° Second, the Court stated
that its decision was necessary in order to "comport with
the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show 'spe-
cial solicitude' for those who are injured within its juris-
diction."' 6' The Court made no distinction between
Gaudet's application to territorial waters and the high
seas 62
Justice Powell, speaking for the minority, sharply criti-
cized the Court's liberal approach to the damages issue.63
Powell accused the majority of contradicting Congress'
clear intent, as expressed in DOHSA and the Jones Act, to
exclude non-pecuniary damages such as loss of society
from maritime wrongful death actions.64
for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law'...." Id. (quoting Fitzgerald
v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963)).
57 Id.
5, Id. The Court stated further that DOHSA's exclusion from territorial waters
demonstrated Congress' lack of concern for a uniform measure of damages be-
cause many state wrongful death statutes extending to territorial waters provided
a measure of damages more liberal than that of DOHSA. Id.
-' The Court used similar reasoning in its holding that funeral expenses are
also recoverable. Id. at 591.
- Id. at 587.
- Id. at 588.
62 See id. at 583-91. This silence led at least one court to interpret Gaudet to
allow non-pecuniary damages in actions arising on the high seas - the jurisdic-
tional waters of DOHSA. See Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.
1975). See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sea Drilling.
63 Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 605-06.
,- Id. Justice Powell stated: "[T]he Court's holding that loss of society may be
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3. Reconciling DOHSA and Moragne
The Moragne and Gaudet decisions led some lower
courts and commentators to state that DOHSA was obso-
lete.65 This conclusion followed from the fact that, after
Moragne and Gaudet, the general maritime wrongful death
remedy was more comprehensive and provided for a
greater recovery than had been available under the fed-
eral and most state death statutes. 66 This speculation re-
garding DOHSA's demise materialized to a certain extent
when the Fifth Circuit held that non-pecuniary damages
permitted in Gaudet are recoverable under Moragne even in
actions arising on the jurisdictional waters of DOHSA.67
In doing so, the court of appeals clearly indicated its be-
lief that the Moragne remedy had replaced DOHSA.68
However, rumors of the death of DOHSA were greatly
exaggerated as evidenced by Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham.69
In Higginbotham, a helicopter carrying passengers from
an oil drilling platform crashed 100 miles at sea while re-
turning to the Louisiana coast. 70  Survivors of the pilot
recovered is a clear example of the majority's repudiation of the congressional
purposes expressed in [DOHSA and the Jones Act]." Id. at 605.
w, See, e.g., Sea Drilling, 523 F.2d at 795-98 ("No longer does one need ...
DOHSA as a remedy."); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 369-70
(2d ed. 1975) (Moragne, as confirmed by Gaudet, reduced DOHSA "to the level of
[a] nonstatutory Restatement.").
(i'i See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 65, at 370. The general maritime
remedy operates irrespective of territorial boundaries, Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409,
while DOHSA applies only to the high seas, THE LAw OF SEAMEN, supra note 47, at
266. Additionally, the general maritime remedy allows non-pecuniary damages,
Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 584, 591, while DOHSA allows only compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained, THE LAw OF SEAMEN, supra note 47, at 269.
,;7 Sea Drilling, 523 F.2d at 793. In an action arising on the high seas, the court
of appeals specifically allowed recovery for conscious pain and suffering and loss
of society - neither of which is recoverable under DOHSA. Id. In justifying its
holding, the court of appeals pointed out that Gaudet was not limited to territorial
waters. Id. at 796. But see Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 800-01 (1st Cir.
1974) (holding that, where the action arises within the jurisdiction of DOHSA, the
pecuniary loss standard controls).
- See Sea Drilling, 523 F.2d at 795-98 ("No longer does one need ... DOHSA as
a remedy.").
w, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
71 Id. at 619.
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and passengers sought to recover, in addition to the
DOHSA measure of damages, damages recognized in
Gaudet for actions brought under general maritime law.7 t
Thus, the issue before the Court was whether the measure
of damages in Moragne actions arising on the high seas are
determined by reference to Gaudet or to DOHSA. 72 Stat-
ing that "DOHSA should be the courts' primary guide as
they refine the nonstatutory remedy, ' 73 the Court re-
jected the plaintiff's approach, and held that, because
DOHSA governs the measure of damages recoverable for
deaths on the high seas, supplemental damages recover-
able under general maritime law are not available.7 ' The
Court concluded that, although it is sometimes necessary
to supplement maritime statutes, 75 Congress had defini-
tively spoken on the issue of damages when it enacted
DOHSA.76 Since Congress had spoken on the damages
issue, the Court determined it was "not free to 'supple-
ment' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act be-
comes meaningless. 7 7
71 Id. at 618. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Gaudet.
72 Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623. The Court noted that Sea Drilling, supra notes
67-68 and accompanying text, read Gaudet as a replacement for DOHSA. Id.
However, in framing the issue before it, the Higginbotham Court stated that Gaudet
applied only to coastal waters. Id.
73 Id. at 625.
74 See id. at 624-26. The Court acknowledged that this conclusion would create
a discrepancy between the measure of damages available under the general mari-
time law on territorial waters and on the high seas. Id. at 624. However, the
Court stated that a desire for uniformity cannot override the statutory effect of
DOHSA. Id.
75 See id. at 625. The Court agreed that "because Congress has never enacted a
comprehensive maritime code," admiralty courts would find it necessary to sup-
plement maritime statutes on issues which were not addressed by Congress. Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. The Court distinguished Moragne, which created a wrongful death rem-
edy that supplemented federal statutory remedies, on the ground that such a rem-
edy was created in the absence of federal legislation regarding territorial waters. Id.
The Court further pointed out that:
Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pe-
cuniary losses in order to encourage the creation of non-pecuniary
supplements. There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by
Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively
and specifically enacted. In the area covered by the statute, it would
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4. Section 7 of DOHSA
While the Court in Higginbotham refused to supplement
DOHSA's damage provisions with damages provided by
the general maritime law, the Court did not indicate
whether applicable state statutes may supplement the
Act. s This uncertainty focused on section 7 of DOHSA
which provides, inter alia, that "[t]he provisions of any
state statute giving or regulating rights of action or reme-
dies for death shall not be affected by this Act."' 79 A literal
reading of this section arguably conveys the intent that,
where state statutes were competent to remedy or regu-
late accidents on the high seas before DOHSA, that com-
petence remained viable after DOHSA.8 0  However,
appreciation of the historical background of section 7 ex-
poses the latent controversy facing the Tallentire court.8 '
The genesis of this controversy is the somewhat infa-
mous "Mann Amendment" to section 7 of DOHSA which
was adopted prior to DOHSA's passage.8 2 Section 7, in
its original form, provided in relevant part that "the pro-
visions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of
action or remedies shall not be affected by this Act as to
causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any
state."8  However, the Mann Amendment deleted the last
be no more appropriate to prescribe a different statute of limita-
tions, or a different class of beneficiaries.
Id. (citations omitted).
78 See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of Higginbotham.
The distinction between the general maritime law and state statutory law is signifi-
cant because the general maritime law is a product of federal, as opposed to state,
authority. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial power shall extend.., to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction .... " Id. Thus, the effect of
section 7 of DOHSA on state authority to legislate on the high seas remained to
be addressed. See infra notes 79-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of
section 7.
7, 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982). See supra note 13 for the full text of section 7.
" See Alexander v. United Technologies Corp., 548 F. Supp. 139, 142 (D.
Conn. 1982).
- Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2489.
82 59 CONG. REC. 4484-87 (1920).
8- Id. at 4482 (emphasis added). For section 7 in its present form, see supra
note 13. Comments by several of the original bill's proponents confirm the ap-
parent intent of section 7's language that DOHSA would provide the exclusive
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clause of section 7, leaving the provision in its present
form.84 Unfortunately, the legislative history of the
amendment does not clearly reveal the intended effect of
the deletion.85
Lower courts disagree on section 7's effect on the abil-
remedy over the high seas. Id. (remarks of Rep. Volstead) ("beyond [the three
mile limit provided by the act] the state law does not apply, but this cause of
action does apply"). By the same token, the states would provide the exclusive
remedy over territorial waters. See id. at 4483 (remarks of Rep. Montague) ("the
territorial waters of the States shall be retained within the jurisdiction and sover-
eignty of the states and their courts") ("this section is put in out of abundant
caution, to calm the minds of those who think that rights within territorial waters
will be usurped by the national law").
84 Id. at 4484-87. From his statements, Representative Mann, offeror of the
amendment, apparently (but not unambiguously) intended to preserve state
power to confer death remedies for deaths on the high seas. See id. at 4484 ("If
the amendment which I have suggested should be agreed to, the bill would not
interfere in any way with rights now granted by any State statute, whether the
cause of action accrued within the territorial limits of the State or not.").
- See id. at 4484-86. Even if Representative Mann did intend the amendment to
allow states to confer remedies for deaths on the high seas, there is evidence that,
in passing the amendment, other members of the House did not believe the
amendment would have such an effect. See id. at 4483-85. At least some of the
representatives felt that, even in the absence of the deleted language, the back-
ground and purpose of the Act would implicitly command that DOHSA have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the high seas. Id. at 4483. Representative Montague
commented:
In reply to the statement of my colleague [Mr. Moore] I will say that
jurisdiction upon this subject is found in the Constitution of the
United States, and it has been held over and over again by our
courts that when the Congress legislates in pursuance of constitu-
tional authority such a law is exclusive. It requires no asseveration
in the bill to make it exclusive. It is exclusive by virtue of it superior
jurisdiction; therefore, I submit, it is needless to amend this bill now
and raise the chance of its defeat by adding a mere adjective when by
the very force of the Constitution and the law in pursuance thereof it
is inherently and necessarily exclusive.
Id. Other members were apparently under the impression that federal legislation
in the area would supercede any state law competence to regulate or remedy acci-
dents on the high seas. Id. at 4485. Representative Volstead expressed this view:
The view taken by the parties who drew this bill is that it is exclusive,
because, as the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Montague] pointed
out, the power to pass laws on this subject is conferred on Congress
in the Constitution, and whenever Congress acts I have no doubt it
excludes the power on the part of the State to pass laws on the same
subject.
Id. In sum, there is some evidence that at least a portion of the House, in passing
the amendment, believed the meaning of section 7 in its final form was no differ-
ent from its original import that DOHSA remedies be exclusive on the high seas.
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ity of state statutes to confer a wrongful death remedy in
actions arising on the high seas.8 6 Many courts interpret
section 7 to preserve state remedies only on territorial wa-
ters.87 However, other courts have reached the opposite
conclusion, viz., that Congress intended section 7 to pre-
serve state remedies on the high seas as well as on territo-
rial waters.8 8
Some courts and commentators have taken the issue a
step further. According to this view, although state sub-
stantive remedies are preempted on the high seas,
DOHSA confers concurrent jurisdiction between federal
and state courts.8 " Under this scheme, the state courts
81, See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case law
regarding section 7.
87 See Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 801 n.10 (1st Cir. 1974); Jennings v.
Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 227 F. Supp. 246, 248 (D.D.C. 1964); Devlin v. Flying
Tiger Lines, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 924, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Petition of Gulf Oil
Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121
F. Supp. 85, 89 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Echavarria v. Atlantic & Caribbean Steam Nay.
Co., 10 F. Supp. 677, 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). Numerous commentators on the sub-
ject concur with the view that DOHSA preempts state remedies. See G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 65, at 37, 651; Note, Maritime Wrongful Death After Moragne:
The Seaman's Legal Life Boat, 49 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1417 (1971); Note, The Tangled
Seine: A Survey of Maritime Personal Injury Remedies, 57 YALE L.J. 243, 271 (1947).
8 See In re Complaint of Exxon Corp., 548 F. Supp. 977, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Alexander v. United Technologies Corp., 548 F. Supp. 139, 142 (D. Conn. 1982);
Rairigh v. Erlbeck, 488 F. Supp. 865 (D. Md. 1978); Chute v. United States, 466 F.
Supp. 61, 65 n.9 (D. Mass. 1978); Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
241 F. Supp. 501, 508-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Sierra v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 107 F. Supp. 519, 520-21 (D.P.R. 1952); see also Lowe v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 9, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding DOHSA does not pre-
empt state statutes without discussing section 7).
- See Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y.
1965). In Safir, the court held that a New York state court was competent to enter-
tain a wrongful death suit arising on the high seas. Id. at 507-09. The court con-
cluded that the state wrongful death statutes were the source ofjurisdiction, but
DOHSA was the governing rule of law. Id. at 507-08. Disagreeing with the con-
clusion reached in Devlin andJennings, see supra note 87 and accompanying text, the
court concluded that the "modest language" of section 7 was insufficient to con-
fine all wrongful death suitors to admiralty claims in federal court. Safir, 241 F.
Supp. at 508-09. Instead, a wrongful death suit of this kind is one '"saved to suit-
ors' by the ancient exception of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) [the saving to suitors
clause]." Id. at 509. See infra note 117 for a discussion of the saving to suitors
clause. See also Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 258, 176 N.E. 2d 280,
219 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1961) (holding section 7 allows recourse to state procedure to
enforce substantive rights provided by DOHSA). Cf Moragne, 398 U.S. at 400
n. 14 (section 7 of DOHSA does not confer exclusive jurisdiction to the admiralty
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may entertain wrongful death actions arising on the high
seas, as a matter of procedure, while applying the substan-
tive provisions of DOHSA. 90
Apparently, Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc.91 is the
only previous court of appeals decision to directly con-
front the issue of whether DOHSA preempts state wrong-
ful death statutes. In Nygaard, the court of appeals held
that DOHSA preempts application of state statutes to the
high seas without mentioning section 7.92 Instead, the
court of appeals concluded that maritime uniformity re-
quired that DOHSA be the exclusive remedy.93 Nygaard
expressed no view on the state court's ability to entertain
DOHSA actions.9 4
side of the federal courts); Rairigh v. Erlbeck, 488 F. Supp. 865 (D. Md. 1980);
Batkiewicz v. Seas Shipping Co., 53 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). This view
is endorsed by a number of commentators. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 236-37
(1969); 1 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 142 at 382 (6th ed.
1940); G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 16
(1939); Forde, Concurrent Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts in Actions Under the
Federal Death on the High Seas Act, 1969 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 27; Magruder & Grout,
supra note 32, at 420.
90 See supra note 89.
9, 701 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983).
9,2 Id. at 80. In Nygaard, survivors of a seaman lost at sea appealed the trial
court's refusal to award damages for loss of society - a non-pecuniary loss - under
either the Jones Act or the Alaska wrong death statute. Id. at 78-79. After holding
that the Jones Act denies recovery for non-pecuniary losses, the court of appeals
held that DOHSA preempts applicability of the Alaska death act. Id. at 80.
,3 Id. The court of appeals stated that its holding that maritime uniformity re-
quires preemption of state statute by DOHSA was based on "the logical import"
of its earlier holding in Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding general maritime law preempts state wrongful death statutes because of
the need for uniformity in maritime wrongful death actions) and the Fifth Circuit's
decision in In re S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding wrongful
death remedy provided in Moragne precludes recognition in admiralty of state
wrongful death statutes). Id. The court further stated: "If the federal remedial
scheme for death within state territorial waters takes precedence over state reme-
dies, then certainly the federal remedial scheme for death on the high seas where
the primacy of federal interests is far clearer, should also take precedence." Id.
Other district court cases hold that DOHSA preempts state statutes without ex-
amining section 7. See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp.
447, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 439, 446
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
114 Nygaard, 702 F.2d 77.
278 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
II. OFFSHORE LOGISTICS, INC. V. TALLENTIRE - THE
COURT'S ANALYSIS
The issue presented before the Tallentire court was
"whether the DOHSA measure of recovery may be sup-
plemented by the remedies provided by state law, through
either OCSLA or § 7 of DOHSA. 9 5
A. OCSLA Not Applicable to Admiralty Cases
The Tallentire Court unanimously rejected the plain-
tifffs' argument that Louisiana law should apply as a sur-
rogate federal law through OCSLA.96 In doing so, the
Court stated that while DOHSA was enacted to provide a
maritime remedy for wrongful death on the high seas,
"OCSLA, by contrast, provides an essentially nonmaritime
remedy and controls only on 'the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed
structures' erected thereon. ' 97 Accordingly, DOHSA and
OCSLA have completely different applications - the for-
mer to admiralty actions and the latter to actions arising
from the artificial structures covered by the Act.98 In this
interpretation, the Court referred back to its earlier analy-
sis of OCSLA in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 99 In
Rodrigue, the Court noted that accidents on the artificial
islands covered by OCSLA "had no more connection with
the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents on
piers. o1 00
i, Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2492.
m" See id. at 2492-94. Under OCSLA, state law is adopted by the courts and
applied as federal law (i.e., "surrogate" federal law) to the extent that it is not in-
consistent with applicable federal law. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355-56 (1969). For a discussion and the relevant text of OC-
SLA, see supra note 7.
117 Talentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2492 (quoting OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A)
(1982)(emphasis added)).
- Id.
1'' 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
- Id. at 360. In Rodrique, the Court held that an admiralty action does not
apply to accidents actually occurring on the artificial islands covered by OCSLA.
Id. Therefore, DOHSA does not preclude the application of state law as adopted
federal law through OCSLA to wrongful death actions arising from accidents on
offshore platforms which are located on the high seas. Id.
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Given the mutually exclusive application of DOHSA
and OCSLA, the Tallentire Court held that the plaintiffs'
cause of action was in admiralty, therefore precluding ap-
plication of OCSLA.' 0 The Court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that facts such as the decedents' status as plat-
form workers and that they were killed while commuting
from their platform to Louisiana brought them within
OCSLA's jurisdiction. 10 2 The Court held applicability of
OCSIA is decisively determined by the locale of the acci-
dent, not the status of the decedents.10 3  Since the crash
occurred at sea, miles from the platform, the cause of ac-
tion was in admiralty.'0 4 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court also dismissed as insignificant the fact that the de-
cedents were killed while riding in a helicopter instead of
a more traditional maritime conveyance. 0 5 The Court
held admiralty jurisdiction was properly invoked because
the accident occurred on the high seas and the helicopter
was engaged in an activity bearing a significant relation-
ship to a maritime activity. 106
In sum, the Court held that OCSLA and admiralty have
to, See Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2493.
102 Id. "The character of the decedents as platform workers who have a special
relationship with the shore community simply has no special relevance to the res-




00 Id. In reaching the conclusion that the helicopter crash was within admiralty
jurisdiction, the Court referred back to its decision in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc.
v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). In Executive Jet Aviation, the Court held
that the fact that an aircraft crashes on navigable waters or that the negligence
occurs while the aircraft was flying over such waters is insufficient to confer fed-
eral admiralty jurisdiction. Executive Jet Aviation, 409 U.S. at 261. Such jurisdiction
is properly invoked only when there is a significant relationship to a traditional
maritime activity. Id. at 268. The Tallentire Court held that the "traditional mari-
time activity" requirement was satisfied because the helicopter was performing
the traditional maritime function of ferrying passengers from an "island" to
shore. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2493. Jurisdiction under DOHSA was also properly
invoked because the accident occurred on the high seas. Id. See also supra note 41
for the relevant text of section 1 of DOHSA (codified as 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982))
which defines the statute's jurisdiction.
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mutually exclusive jurisdictions. 0 7 OCSLA had no rele-
vance to the action because this is an admiralty case.1
0 8
B. DOHSA Precludes State Remedies
The Court next turned to the issue of whether non-pe-
cuniary damages provided by state statute may supple-
ment the DOHSA remedies. 0 9 The Court interpreted
section 7 of DOHSA as a jurisdictional saving clause, in-
tended only to confer upon states: (1) exclusive jurisdic-
tion over wrongful death actions arising from territorial
waters; and (2) concurrent jurisdiction over actions
brought under DOHSA, i.e., those arising on the high
seas. 1 0 The effect of the concurrent jurisdiction is to
grant to states the right to entertain such actions while
applying the DOHSA provisions."' The Court cited four
considerations in reaching its conclusions: "[1] [T]he lan-
guage of the Act as a whole, [2] the legislative history of
section 7, [3] the congressional purposes underlying the
Act, and [4] the importance of uniformity of admiralty
law."' 12
1. Language of DOHSA
First, the Court stated that Congress would have explic-
itly preserved the states' power to apply their substantive
law to the high seas if that was its intention."13 Section 4
of DOHSA' "' explicitly preserves applicability of foreign
jurisdiction substantive law to DOHSA actions under the
,o7 TalLentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2493. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100 for a
discussion of the jurisdiction of DOHSA and OCSLA.
Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2493.
I ld. at 2492.
1 Id
- See id. For a discussion of courts and commentators endorsing this conclu-
sion, see supra note 89.
1 Id. To justify application of such an analysis, the Court cited Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Bois-
dor6, 49 U.S. (1 How.) 113, 122 (1849) which stated: "In expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.").
, See id. at 2494-95.
,14 46 U.S.C. § 764 (1982).
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appropriate circumstances." t5 In the Court's view, Con-
gress would have been similarly explicit if it intended sec-
tion 7 to have the same effect as section 4 with regard to
the states.'1
6
Additionally, the Court relied upon the "marked simi-
larity" of section 7 to the "saving to suitors" clause" t7
which allows litigants to bring in personam maritime actions
in state courts. "8 The Court held that section 7's similar-
ity to the saving to suitors clause, which grants non-sub-
stantive concurrent jurisdiction to the states, supported a
reading of section 7 to that same effect."t 9 Stated simply,
section 7 grants to the states the right to merely entertain
the action without invoking the states' substantive law. 120
11 Id. Section 4 of DOHSA (later codified at 46 U.S.C. § 764) provides:
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign State
on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring
upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in an appropriate
action in admiralty in the courts of the United States without abate-
ment in respect to the amount for which recovery is authorized, any
statute of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
16 Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
11 Originally part of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, the "saving to suitors"
clause is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982) which reads in part as follows:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the courts of the
States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled .... "
This clause allows a suitor asserting an in personam admiralty claim to elect to
sue in "common law" state court through an ordinary civil action. In such ac-
tions, the state courts must apply the same substantive law as would be applied
had the suit been instituted in admiralty in a federal court. Shannon v. City of
Anchorage, 478 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1970).
-S Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2495.
I'D Id.
120 Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
Thus, a natural reading of § 7 is that a state statute providing a
wrongful death right of action traditionally unavailable at common
law, would not be "affected" by DOHSA in the sense of being ren-
dered an incompetent means of invoking state jurisdiction, but the
state statute's substantive provisions would not, by virtue of the sav-
ing provision, "extend as a conduct-governing enactment on the
high seas" in conflict with DOHSA's provisions.
Id. (citing Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501, 508
(E.D.N.Y. 1965)).
282 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
2. Legislative History of Section 7
The Court cited the legislative history of section 7
before and after the Mann Amendment to support its con-
clusion that section 7 is a jurisdictional saving clause.12'
The Court noted that DOHSA's original drafters, the
Maritime Law Association (MLA), intended section 7 to
be a jurisdictional saving clause which would create con-
current jurisdiction for the states.' 22 The MLA believed
such a clause was required to achieve the concurrent juris-
diction effect because of the 1917 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.'12  Jensen denied
availability of a state statutory remedy in an admiralty ac-
tion because it was not a common law remedy saved to
suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to federal
courts over matters in admiralty. 24
In the Court's view, the legislative history of section 7
demonstrated an intent to preserve the state's power to
confer remedies for wrongful deaths arising from acci-
dents on territorial waters.125 Moreover, section 7 had the
incidental effect of allowing a state, in the exercise of its
concurrent jurisdiction, to apply state remedies not incon-
sistent with substantive maritime law.' 2 6 Since a state had
121 See id. at 2496-97.
"' Id. at 2495.
"2-, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
124 See id. at 218. Jensen held that, because a state workmen's compensation rem-
edy was unknown at common law, such action was not "saved to suitors" when the
jurisdiction was in admiralty. See id. Consequently, the states were incompetent
to confer such a remedy where the action was in admiralty. Id. Allowing states to
do so, the Court reasoned, would contravene the Constitution's exclusive grant of
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal judiciary. Id.
The Tallentire Court pointed out that, as discussed in Jensen, wrongful death
remedies, as well as worker's compensation remedies, were unknown at common
law. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2496. Thus, the MLA believed an explicit jurisdic-
tional saving clause might be needed to ensure state jurisdiction over wrongful
death actions arising from territorial waters. Id. at 2495-96. For further discussion
ofJensen, see supra note 28.
12-, Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2496. "[T]he remarks of the proponents of[DOHSA]
amply support the theory that § 7 originally was intended to preserve the state
courts' jurisdiction to provide wrongful death remedies under state law for fatali-
ties on territorial waters." Id.
121 Id.
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the power to provide remedies for wrongful deaths on its
territorial waters12 7 and DOHSA was explicitly limited to
wrongful deaths occurring beyond territorial waters, sec-
tion 7, as originally proposed, ensured that the states re-
tained the power to confer territorial water remedies. 128
Next, the Court determined whether the Mann Amend-
ment to section 7 was intended to allow state wrongful
death statutes to operate on the high seas. After citing
remarks of various representatives during the House de-
bate, the Court stated that DOHSA's proponents clearly
intended the Act to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction
over the high seas. 129 Regarding the effect of the Mann
Amendment, the Court held that it allowed states to serve
as a forum for wrongful death actions arising on the high
seas in which they must apply the substantive rules of
DOHSA.13 0  However, the Court further stated that the
amendment "did not implicitly sanction the operation of
state wrongful death statutes on the high seas in the same
manner as the saving clause did in territorial waters."''
Finally, the Court buttressed this conclusion with more
ambiguous indications of Congress' intent when it passed
DOHSA in its final form. First, some of the representa-
tives' comments expressed a belief that, under Jensen,132
federal legislation regarding the high seas would preempt
application of conflicting state legislation to the high
seas. 3 3 Second, there was doubt about the extent of Con-
127 See American Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872).
,28 Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2496.
-, Id. "[DOHSA's proponents] stated their firm intent to make exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction over wrongful death actions arising on the high seas by restricting
the scope of § 7 to territorial waters." Id.
130 Id. at 2497. The Court stated: "By suggesting the deletion of the language
limiting the jurisdictional saving clause's scope only to territorial waters, Repre-
sentative Mann intended to ensure that state courts could also serve as a forum
for the adjudication of wrongful death actions arising out of accidents on the high
seas." Id.
1 ] Id.
1.,2 See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text for a discussion ofJensen.
,- Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2497; see supra note 85 for the comments of Rep.
Volstead. InJensen, the Court stated, "no [state] legislation is valid if it contra-
venes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress." Jensen, 244 U.S. at
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gress' ability to constitutionally delegate its jurisdiction
over maritime activities to the states.' 3 4 In sum, the Court
held that if Congress intended section 7 to require en-
forcement of substantive state law on the high seas, it
would have done so explicitly. 135  Further, the Court
stated that its conclusion is supported by section 7's legis-
lative history and is consistent with the prevailing view of
the law at the time of its passage. 136
3. Purposes Underlying DOHSA
Next, the Court held that Congressional purposes be-
hind DOHSA mandates the Court's interpretation of sec-
tion 7. In the Court's view, DOHSA was enacted with two
purposes in mind. The first was to provide a wrongful
death remedy where previously there had been none. 137
Second, DOHSA was intended to achieve a uniform pro-
vision of a maritime wrongful death remedy. 138 Given the
Act's uniformity objectives, the Court held it is "hardly
conceivable" that Congress intended widely divergent
state wrongful death statutes to apply on the high seas. 39
Further, the Court noted that the majority of cases and
216. For further discussion ofjensen, see supra note 28, notes 123-124 and accom-
panying text.
134 Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2498. The Court cited Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stew-
art, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) in which the Court held that Congress, in seeking to
authorize the states to prescribe and enforce maritime workmen's compensation
rights and remedies, unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power concerning
maritime and admiralty jurisdiction. Id. The Court reasoned that such a delega-
tion would defeat the object of the constitutional grant of authority - namely the
achievement of harmonious and uniform maritime law. See id.
1- Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2498.
13c, Id. at 2499. Specifically, the Court stated: "In sum, we believe that our read-
ing of section 7, while not free from doubt, gives the proper meaning to the lan-
guage of the section, is supported by its legislative history, and is consistent with
the law governing at the time of its passage." Id.
', Id. Under The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, there was no action for wrongful
death under the general maritime law. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying
text for a discussion of The Harrisburg.
'-" Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2499. "Congress acted in 1920 . . . to achieve uni-
formity in the provision of such a remedy." Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1920); S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1919)
(emphasizing importance of uniformity on the high seas).
, Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2499. For a discussion of the application of state
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commentators have reached the same conclusion. 40
4. Importance of Uniformity
Lastly, the Court held that uniformity of wrongful death
remedies facilitates "the effective and just administration
of those remedies."' 4' The Court cited two examples to
support this contention. First, recognition of concurrent
state jurisdiction to hear DOHSA actions provides a con-
venient forum to the parties.1 42 Second, the holding that
states have concurrent jurisdiction to hear DOHSA ac-
tions is consistent with the concurrent jurisdiction
granted to the states in Jones Act 143 and OCSLA144 ac-
tions. 145 Jurisdictional uniformity between these acts will
allow survivors of those killed on the high seas, who each
present claims under different acts, to bring their action in
the same forum. 146
Thus, the Court held these four considerations re-
quired it to interpret section 7 as a jurisdictional saving
clause and not a statement that state substantive law ap-
wrongful death statutes to the high seas, see supra notes 30-39 and accompanying
text.
140 Id. For a list of authority supporting the proposition that state statutes may
not be applied to the high seas, see supra note 87. The Court also noted that
many courts and commentators support the Court's holding that section 7 is a
jurisdictional saving clause. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2499. For discussion of the
authority supporting this position, see supra note 89.
,4, Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2500.
14. Id. The Court further stated that state courts are competent to hear DOHSA
actions because resolution of such claims does not generally require the expertise
that admiralty courts provide. Id.
14 See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 46 (1926) (state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over Jones Act claims). See supra note 42 for a discussion
of the Jones Act.
14 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981) (recognizing
state courts' concurrent jurisdiction over OCSLA claims). See supra note 7, notes
96-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of OSCLA.
, Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2500.
146 Since the states were granted concurrent jurisdiction over the Jones Act
(seaman) claims, supra note 143, the unavailability of such jurisdiction for DOHSA
(seaman or non-seaman) claims might require survivors of persons killed in the
same accident to bring their action in separate forums, depending upon which Act
their actions are based. See supra note 41 for a discussion of the Jones Act.
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plies to wrongful deaths on the high seas. 14 7 Therefore,
the Court concluded, DOHSA preempts application of
state wrongful death statutes to the high seas.' 48
The Court admitted that the resulting denial of non-pe-
cuniary damages in wrongful death actions arising from
the high seas is inconsistent with the availability of such
damages in Moragne actions arising from territorial wa-
ters. 149 However, this consideration was "overshadowed
by the potential for serious conflicts between DOHSA and
state substantive law in such areas as limitations periods,
classes of beneficiaries, and the definition of potential
defenses."'t5 0
Justice Powell, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens, dissented on the grounds that the plain language of
section 7 and its legislative history clearly indicate that the
Mann Amendment was intended to preserve state reme-
dies on the high seas.'"' However, all justices agreed that
OCSLA was inapplicable to the action. 5 2 Injustice Pow-
ell's view, the language of section 7 clearly preserved all
state remedies for wrongful death at sea without territo-
rial qualification. 53 Beyond the language of section 7, the
dissent viewed its legislative history as representing Con-
gress' intent, in passing the Mann Amendment, to accom-
plish that same end. 54 Finally, the dissent stated that the
,47 Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2494.
148 Id. at 2500.
14', Id. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Moragne.
In Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, the Court allowed recovery of non-pecuniary damages in
Moragne actions. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Gaudet.
'f" Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2500.
See id. at 2501.
1-12 Id. at n.l.
i. Id. at 2502. "[A]ithough the original § 7 preserved state-law rights of action
within territorial waters, the ultimately enacted § 7 preserved these rights of ac-
tion without geographic qualification. [Section] 7 is plainly intended to save state
remedies for death on the high seas." Id. See supra note 13 for the full text of
section 7.
'4 Id. at 2502-04. "Despite the confusion of the debate, it is clear that the
Mann Amendment removed the clause that expressly limited state remedies 'to
causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any State.' " Id. at 2503
(emphasis original).
[53
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majority's goal of uniformity of result was not a ground by
which the Court could ignore Congress' decision to allow
states to provide a remedy for wrongful deaths on the
high seas.' 55
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Tallentire holds unequivocally that DOHSA preempts
application of substantive state wrongful death statutes to
actions arising on the high seas; but section 7 of DOHSA,
acting as a jurisdictional "saving clause," allows state
courts to entertain DOHSA actions while applying the
substantive rules of the Act.' 56 This scheme will allow
beneficiaries to bring their actions in the admiralty side or
civil side of federal court, or in a civil action in state
court. 57 Being able to bring suits in state courts and fed-
eral courts on the civil side, DOHSA parties now have the
right to a jury trial. 58 This is analogous to the rules re-
garding where a Jones Act' 5 9 suit may be brought. 60
Preemption of state statutes on the high seas will con-
tribute to a more uniform provision of wrongful death
remedies in actions arising on the high seas. Wrongful
death remedies can not be mixed and matched to suit the
plaintiff. All survivors of non-seamen killed on the high
seas will look to a single statute, DOHSA, for a remedy.
, Id. at 2504.
'.' See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
Court's holding.
157 See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE, supra note 89, at 236-38; Forde, supra note 89,
at 29, 36. Federal jurisdiction on the admiralty side is proper under section 1 of
DOHSA which provides, inter alia, that DOHSA beneficiaries "may maintain a suit
for damages.., in admiralty." 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982). State courts have jurisdic-
tion to entertain civil actions under the provisions of DOHSA pursuant to the
holding in Tallentire. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Court's holding. Accordingly, such civil actions involving diversity of
citizenship can invoke diversity jurisdiction on the civil side of federal court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
,58 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 89, at 236-38; Forde, supra note 89,
at 29; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 38 (right to jury trial). No right to trial by jury exists
on the admiralty side. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
1') See supra note 41 for a discussion of the Jones Act.
1- See THE LAW OF SEAMEN, supra note 47, at 413.
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Regarding the measure of damages, all wrongful death
remedies awarded in actions arising on the high seas are
limited to pecuniary losses. 16 1 However, Moragne actions
arising on territorial waters will allow non-pecuniary dam-
ages.' 62 In spite of this discrepancy, other elements of
wrongful death actions under DOHSA will be uniform on
the high seas. These include the statute of limitations, the
designated beneficiaries, and potential defenses. 63 Pre-
emption of-state statutes also avoids the often detailed
choice of law analyses which faced courts in the pre-
DOHSA era. 164
Contrary to the predictions of some commentators and
courts, 165 DOHSA is now the most prominent wrongful
death remedy for deaths on the high seas. Most states al-
low non-pecuniary damages in wrongful death actions. 166
An opposite conclusion in Tallentire regarding the pre-
emption issue would encourage beneficiaries of persons
killed on high seas to pursue the more generous state stat-
utes. The result would have greatly diminished the role
of DOHSA in the field of wrongful death remedies.
Tallentire also avoids certain anomalous possibilities.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that the Moragne
general maritime remedy for wrongful death 67 preempts
state wrongful death statutes when death occurs within
territorial waters. 168 If Tallentire allowed state statutes to
operate on the high seas, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
would allow states to confer remedies on the high seas but
not within territorial waters bordering their own shores.
"1 See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the damages
provided by DOHSA.
1', See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recover-
ability of non-pecuniary damages in Moragne actions.
See Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2500.
" See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the choice of
law analysis necessary when multiple wrongful death statutes may be applicable.
, See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the view that
DOHSA had become obsolete.
,6; See Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 587.
,,7 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Moragne.
1'11 See Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980); In re S.S.
Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Other undesirable situations are avoided by Tallentire's
holding that states have concurrent jurisdiction to enter-
tain DOHSA actions. If, for example, an aircraft crashed
on the high seas, killing 20 passengers, and injuring 20
more, the survivors of the persons killed would have to
bring their actions under DOHSA in federal court if states
did not have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain such ac-
tions. 1 69 However, the injured passengers would have the
opportunity, or possibly be required, to sue in state court
since DOHSA provides a remedy only for wrongful
death. 70  Additionally, the passengers in state court
would probably be entitled to a jury trial, while no such
right exists for the plaintiffs in the admiralty side of fed-
eral court. 171
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As evidenced by the long list of conflicting opinions re-
garding the meaning and effect of section 7,172 any at-
tempt to derive a definitive interpretation from that
provision's language and legislative history is hopeless.173
Even the Tallentire Court conceded the possibility of error
on this point. 74 However, the Court's decision is the cor-
rect one for a number of reasons. First, the Court
avoided a holding that would have judicially repealed the
significance of DOHSA.175 Such a result can not be consis-
tent with Congress' intent when it passed DOHSA. Addi-
1'6 See Forde, supra note 89, at 34.
170 Id.
171 Id. As an action in admiralty, there is no right to trial by jury in a DOHSA
action. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
172 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict-
ing interpretations of section 7.
173 For a discussion of the language and legislative history of section 7, see supra
notes 78-90 and accompanying text. Quoting the Fifth Circuit opinion in his dis-
sent, Justice Powell stated: "[A]n attempt to discern the congressional intent from
the conflicting statements by participants in the debate [over DOHSA and the
Mann amendment] is hopeless?" Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2503 (quoting Tallentire,
754 F.2d at 1280-82).
174 See Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2499.
175 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the view that
DOHSA had become obsolete.
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tionally, by adopting a uniform approach to remedies for
deaths on the high seas, the Court spared lower courts the
often difficult task of selecting an appropriate death stat-
ute under conflict of law analysis. 76 Finally, the Court's
attention to this need for uniformity in the field of admi-
ralty and the overall purposes of DOHSA seems to be a
wiser approach than an apparently futile attempt to un-
tangle the twisted history and ambiguous language of sec-
tion 7.
Regardless of the approach taken by the Supreme
Court, the best solution to this controversy is for Con-
gress to amend the Act in order to decisively express its
view on the matter. Since the controversy arises from un-
certainty about Congressional intent, it certainly seems
most appropriate that Congress settle the issue.
Zachary W. Allen
"7 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict
of law analyses which were typically employed before DOHSA's passage.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SEARCH AND SEIZURE -
The warrantless, naked-eye police observation of a
fenced-in backyard of a home from an airplane operating
in public airspace at an altitude of one thousand feet did
not violate the fourth amendment. California v. Ciraolo, 106
S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
In September 1982 the Santa Clara police received an
anonymous telephone tip regarding marijuana growing in
the defendant's backyard.' Police officer Shutz conducted
a ground level investigation but could not see into the
yard because a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner
fence completely enclosed it.2 Shutz secured a private
plane, flew over the defendant's house at an altitude of
one thousand feet, 3 and identified marijuana plants grow-
ing in the fenced-in yard.4 Shutz obtained a search war-
rant based on an affidavit describing the anonymous tip
and the aerial observation. When the police executed
the warrant the next day, they seized seventy-three mari-
juana plants and arrested the defendant for cultivating
marijuana. 6
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the
ground that the aerial surveillance constituted an unrea-
sonable search in violation of the fourth amendment to
California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1810 (1986).
2 Id.
3 Id. Shutz flew within public navigable airspace. Public navigable airspace is
defined as "airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regula-
tions issued under this chapter." 49 U.S.C. § 1301(29) (1982).
4 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1810. Shutz made a naked-eye observation of the mari-
juana plants which were eight to ten feet in height growing in a fifteen-by-twenty-
five foot plot in the defendant's yard. Id. Shutz photographed the area with a
standard 35mm camera. Id. at 1810-11.
Id. at 1811. Shutz attached the photograph depicting the defendant's house,
backyard, and neighboring homes to the affidavit as an exhibit. Id.
6 Id.
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the United States Constitution.7 The trial court denied
the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, so the
defendant pled guilty to a charge of cultivation of mari-
juana.8 The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court on the ground that the warrantless aerial observa-
tion of the defendant's backyard constituted an unreason-
able search in violation of the fourth amendment.9 The
California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for
review, and the United States Supreme Court subse-
quently granted the State's petition for certiorari.'" Held,
reversed: The warrantless naked-eye observation of a
fenced-in backyard of a home from an airplane operating
in public airspace at an altitude of one thousand feet did
not violate the fourth amendment. California v. Ciraolo,
106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion safeguards "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures .. .""t In early cases in-
Id. See infra note 11 for the text of the fourth amendment.
8 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
9 People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 98 (1984).
In reaching this conclusion, the California Court of Appeals deemed it significant
that the aerial police surveillance of the defendant's backyard did not result from a
routine patrol but was undertaken for the specific purpose of observing the de-
fendant's backyard. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97. By holding that this pur-
poseful police observation violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of
privacy, the court implied that if a policeman on a routine aerial patrol had identi-
fied the marijuana, the court would have upheld the search. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at
1813 n.2. The United States Supreme Court found it difficult to understand how
the defendant's expectations of privacy from aerial observation might differ when
two airplanes pass overhead at the same altitude but for different purposes. Id.
lo Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The full text of the amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The framing and adoption of the fourth amendment was motivated by the
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volving the scope of the fourth amendment protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures, the United
States Supreme Court used real property concepts, i.e.,
the "house," the "curtilage,"' 2 and the "open fields," to
British government's abuses of both the general warrants in England and the writs
of assistance in the colonies. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981).
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608-09 (1979) (White,J., dissenting); Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1964); N. LASsON, THE HISTORY AND DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 137-78
(1937). The general warrant specified only a general offense, i.e., seditious libel,
and gave the executing officials discretion to decide where to search. Steagald, 204
U.S. at 220. Similarly, the writs of assistance used in the colonies noted only the
object of the search, i.e., any uncustomed goods, and thus left customs officials
completely free to search any place where they suspected such goods were lo-
cated. Id.
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were
those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which of-
ficers of the Crown had so much bedeviled the colonists. The hated
writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket authority to
search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of British
tax laws. They were denounced by James Otis as 'the worst instru-
ment of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English
law book,' because they placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands
of every petty officer.' The historic occasion of that denunciation, in
1761 at Boston, has been characterized as 'perhaps the most promi-
nent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the
oppressions of the mother country.' 'Then and there,' said John Ad-
ams, 'then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition
to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born.'
Payton, 445 U.S. at 583 n.21 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625
(1885)).
12 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the curtilage as "a small court, yard,
girth, or piece of ground attached to a dwelling house, and forming one enclosure
with it, or so regarded by law; the area attached to and containing a dwelling
house and its out-buildings." 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1278 (1933). See
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826 n.3 (1986) (for most
homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the concept
defining the curtilage - as the area around the home to which the activity of
home life extends - is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experi-
ence); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993 (1st Cir. 1981) (officers
within the fenced-in area surrounding the home were within the curtilage); United
States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453-54 (5th Cir. 1978) (curtilage does not ex-
tend beyond the most remote building).
The curtilage has been afforded the same fourth amendment protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures as the home. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812, 1816
(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). Courts have consid-
ered several factors when determining whether the area searched was located
within the curtilage. Relevant factors include: 1) the distance between the area
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define the reach of the fourth amendment. 3 Because the
amendment expressly enumerates "houses," the Supreme
Court has consistently afforded the highest level of pro-
tection to the home' 4 and other dwellings.' 5 The prop-
claimed to be within the curtilage and the home, 2) the nature of the uses to which
the area is put, 3) and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by passersby. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1817 (Powell, J., dissenting). See
Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir.) (to determine whether the place
searched is within the curtilage one must consider the relevant facts, including: 1)
its proximity or annexation to the dwelling, 2) its inclusion within the general
enclosure surrounding the dwelling, and 3) its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to
the domestic economy of the family), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956); see also
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5 (1931) (garage is within the curtilage); Van
Dyke, 643 F.2d at 993-94 (although 150 feet from dwelling, officers lying in honey-
suckle patch inside exclusionary fence were within the curtilage); Williams, 581
F.2d at 454 (limits of the curtilage are defined by the walls of the remote outbuild-
ings); United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292, 1297 (7th Cir.
1976) (goose house 400 feet from farm dwelling was not within the curtilage), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2633 (1977); Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 858 (9th
Cir. 1968)(stockpile of trees located thirty feet from the house was within the cur-
tilage); United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1964)(smokehouse
seventy-five feet from residence was a domestic building constituting part of the
farm home); United States v. Hassell, 336 F.2d 684, 685 (6th Cir. 1964)(a still in
the open field 250 yards from the house was outside the curtilage); Brock v.
United States, 256 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1958)(outbuilding located 150-180 feet
from residence and separated from residence by fence and a gate was not within
the curtilage); Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281, 282-83 (5th Cir.
1957) (chicken house 150 feet from home and separated from it by two fences was
outside the curtilage); Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir.
1956)(barn seventy to eighty yards from house was part of the farm home); Rob-
erson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1948)(smokehouse located
within same fenced enclosure as dwelling was within the curtilage); United States
v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686, 692 (D. Md. 1967)(shed 190 feet from dwelling and
within same semi-improved area was within the curtilage).
1.1 Comment, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: Searching for Constitutional Standards,
52 J. AIR L. & COM. 257, 269 (1986). See generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, §§ 2.3(c)-(g), 2.4(a) (1978). See
supra note 12 for a discussion of "curtilage."
14 The fourth amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. "We have consistently held that the entry into a home to
conduct a search... is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done
pursuant to a warrant." Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 n.25;
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 477-78 (1971); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1958). "At the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1960).
1,5 The fourth amendment protection of the house has been extended to other
residential premises. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540
(1967)(search of apartment invaded interests protected by the fourth amend-
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erty-oriented concepts of the "curtilage" and the "open
fields," each developed and defined by case law, have also
played a significant role in the Supreme Court's fourth
amendment analysis.
In Hester v. United States 16 the Supreme. Court first con-
sidered whether the protection afforded by the fourth
amendment extended beyond the home. Hester involved a
warrantless search of a field by federal agents to locate
two jugs of illegal whiskey. 17 The Supreme Court upheld
the search as constitutional, declaring that "the special
protection accorded by the fourth amendment to the peo-
ple in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not
extended to the open fields.' 8 Thus, the Supreme Court
placed all areas located in the "open fields" completely
outside the scope of the fourth amendment.
The full scope of the open fields doctrine enunciated in
Hester remained unclear until Olmstead v. United States.'9 In
Olmstead the Supreme Court stated that a fourth amend-
ment search did not occur without "an actual physical in-
vasion of [the] house 'or curtilage' " (emphasis added).2 °
Thus, the Court included the curtilage, the private land
immediately surrounding the house, within the fourth
amendment protection from unreasonable searches and
ment); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964)(a guest in a hotel room is
entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)(constitutional protection extends to
rooms in a boarding house); Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir.
1971)(a student occupying a college dorm room enjoys fourth amendment
protection).
265 U.S. 57 (1924).
'7 Id. In Hester the defendant was involved in selling bootleg whiskey. Id.
When the defendant realized he was being watched by federal agents as he made a
sale to a customer, he threw two jugs of whiskey into a nearby field. Id. at 58. The
agents conducted a warrantless search of the field to locate the jugs. Id.
- Id. at 59.
it) 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Olmstead involved a conspiracy to import, possess and
sell liquor unlawfully. Id. at 455-56. Prohibition officers obtained evidence of the
conspiracy by tapping the phone lines of the conspirators. Id. The Court found it
important that "the insertions were made without trespass upon any property of
the defendants." Id. at 457.
21" Id. at 466.
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seizures previously afforded only the "house." 21 When
the Court brought the curtilage within the protection of
the fourth amendment, it impliedly limited the scope of
the open fields doctrine introduced in Hester. After Olm-
stead, the open fields doctrine placed only areas com-
pletely outside the curtilage of a house beyond the
protection of the fourth amendment.2 2
Olmstead also introduced the tort-oriented concept that
a fourth amendment "search" required an actual physical
trespass into a "constitutionally protected area" such as a
house or its curtilage.23 In Olmstead the Supreme Court
found that the fourth amendment did not prohibit the
warrantless wiretapping of the defendants' phones, be-
cause no actual physical entry of the defendants' homes or
2 Id. See Note, Expectations of Privacy in the Open Fields and an Evolving Fourth
Amendment Standard of Legitimacy: Oliver v. United States, 16 N.M.L. REV. 129, 139
(1986); see also Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) ("curtilage"
is also entitled to fourth amendment protection); United States v. Molkenbur, 430
F.2d 563, 566 (8th Cir.) (the curtilage is entitled to the same protection as the
home against search and seizure), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970); Wattenburg, 388
F.2d at 857 (protection afforded by the fourth amendment extends to open areas
immediately adjacent to the house); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398
F.2d 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1968)(protection extends beyond the walls of a home to
the "curtilage"); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1968)
("houses" in the fourth amendment includes the curtilage); Rosencranz v. United
States, 356 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1966)("houses" has been enlarged to include
"curtilage"); Care, 231 F.2d at 25 (protection of the fourth amendment applies to
the curtilage).
22 Note, supra note 21, at 139 n.87. See Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735,
1741 (1984)(an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities con-
ducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the
home); United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976)(protection
provided by the fourth amendment is not extended to the open fields), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir.
1973)(search of an open field without a search warrant is constitutionally permis-
sible); United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1970)(the fourth
amendment protections do not extend to the open fields surrounding a dwelling
and its immediately adjacent curtilage); United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566,
569 (2d Cir. 1964) (protection accorded by the fourth amendment does not ex-
tend to the open fields), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 942 (1965);Janney v. United States,
206 F.2d 601, 604 (4th Cir. 1953) (the fourth amendment does not extend to the
open fields).
2-. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-66. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510 ("The absence of
a physical invasion of the petitioner's premises was ... a vital factor in the Court's
decision in Olmstead."). See generally LAFAVE, supra note 13, at § 2.3.
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offices occurred. 24 As a result of the trespass doctrine of
Olmstead, a warrantless search of land would be judged un-
constitutional only if the area searched was located within
the constitutionally protected curtilage of a house, and a
government agent physically trespassed onto the land.25
In United States v. Katz26 the Supreme Court rejected the
property and tort concepts it adhered to in Hester and Olm-
stead 27 and laid the basis for the "reasonable expectation"
test as the method for determining the reach of the fourth
amendment.28 In Katz, the defendant, a Los Angeles
bookmaker, was convicted for transmitting wagering in-
formation by telephone across state lines. 29  FBI agents
obtained the evidence necessary to convict the defendant
by attaching an electronic listening device to the tele-
phone booth from which he placed calls. 30 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the defendant's conviction. Applying
O240lmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. The Supreme Court instructed that a violation of
the fourth amendment must involve an official search and seizure of the person, a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion
of his house or curtilage. Id. at 466.
25 Note, supra note 21, at 135-36.
26 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27 Comment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
455, 467-68 (1984). The Supreme Court concluded that it would no longer re-
gard the trespass doctrine enunciated in Olmstead as controlling. Katz, 389 U.S. at
353.
2s Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan J., concurring). The touchstone of the fourth
amendment analysis is now the reasonable expectation test introduced by Justice
Harlan in Katz. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811. The test posits a two-part inquiry.
First, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from the
challenged search. Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as rea-
sonable? Id. Whether a person has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy
in the area searched is determined by whether he "took normal precautions to
maintain his privacy." Id. at 1812. Such precautions include "No Trespassing"
signs, fences, and remote locations. Whether the individual's subjective expecta-
tion of privacy is one society will recognize as reasonable turns on "whether the
government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected
by the Fourth Amendment." Id.
While Justice Harlan did not label his "twofold requirement" the "reasonable
expectation" test, his concurrence is credited with the creation of the test. J.
HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4 (1982). The Supreme Court first used the "rea-
sonable expectation" terminology in the majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
2!, Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
-' Id.
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Olmstead's trespass doctrine, the Ninth Circuit found that
no fourth amendment search had occurred since the FBI
did not physically enter the telephone booth occupied by
the defendant. 1
Announcing that the reach of the fourth amendment no
longer turned on the presence or absence of a physical
trespass into a constitutionally protected area, 2 the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction by declaring that
the fourth amendment "protects people, not places." 33
The Court's new fourth amendment analysis focused on
whether a person maintained a "constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation of privacy" from the war-
rantless search.3 4 Justice Harlan introduced the two-part
inquiry fundamental to this analysis. 5 The first part of
the inquiry asks whether the individual has manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy from the challenged
search.3' The second half of the inquiry questions
whether society will find the individual's privacy expecta-
tion objectively reasonable. An individual alleging that
a warrantless search violated his reasonable expectation
of privacy must satisfy both prongs of the reasonable ex-
pectation text. 8 Thus, Katz shifted the focus of the fourth
amendment inquiry from whether a government agent
physically trespassed into a constitutionally protected area
to whether an agent observed an area in which an individ-
ual displayed a reasonable expectation of privacy.3 9
Katz rejected the rigid application of property and tort
law concepts in the fourth amendment analysis. However,
many courts continued to consider the place being
searched in determining whether an individual manifested
41 Id.
.' Id. at 348-49.
- Id. at 353.
. Id. at 351.
Id. at 360 (Harlan J., concurring).
'' See supra note 28 for Harlan's two-part test.
.17 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
I /d.
Note, supra note 21, at 137.
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a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy." 4 ° The Supreme Court upheld this approach in
Oliver v. United States4 1 by reaffirming the open fields doc-
trine established in Hester.42 In Oliver a warrantless search
conducted by narcotics agents uncovered a field of mari-
juana over one mile from the defendant's home. 43 The
Supreme Court held that the government's intrusion
upon the open field did not constitute an unreasonable
search proscribed by the amendment.44
The Court reconciled Hester's absolute exclusion of the
open fields from constitutional protection with Katz's rea-
sonable expectation test by phrasing its reaffirmation of
the open fields doctrine using Katz terminology. The
Court stated, "No expectation of privacy legitimately at-
taches to open fields."4 5 As a result, the Court declared
40 Id.
41 Justice Harlan, who first articulated the reasonable expectation test observed
that although the fourth amendment focuses on "people, not places," the analysis
still requires "reference to a 'place.'" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. The inquiry into
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable must consider the area to which
the expectation attaches. See United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1053 (5th
Cir.)(whenever government agents enter the curtilage they intrude upon individ-
ual's reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Williams,
581 F.2d at 453 (the distinction between the open fields and the curtilage is still
helpful in determining reasonable privacy expectations); Capps, 435 F.2d at 640
(fourth amendment protections do not extend beyond the curtilage); Wattenburg,
388 F.2d at 858 (in placing pile of trees within the curtilage, individual demon-
strated a reasonable expectation of privacy); Skipper v. State, 387 So. 2d 261, 267
(Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (marijuana 200 feet from house was outside the curtilage
and thus outside reasonable expectations of privacy); Comment, Katz in Open
Fields, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 485, 490-91 (1983). See generally Note, A Reconsidera-
tion of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154, 177-79 (1977).
42 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
4. Id. at 1740. "We conclude, as did the Court in deciding Hester v. United States,
that the government's intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those 'unrea-
sonable searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment." Id. In up-
holding searches of open fields as constitutional per se, the Court rejected the
suggestion that these circumstances deserved a case-by-case analysis. Id. at 1742.
It reasoned that an ad hoc approach would only make it difficult to balance the
interests of law enforcement officers and the interests protected by the fourth
amendment. Id.
44 Id. at 1737. The defendant argued that the secluded location of the mari-
juana patch coupled with his "No Trespassing" signs evinced a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. Id.
45 Id. at 1742. In answering the question whether a warrantless intrusion of an
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that all warrantless searches of the open fields were per se
constitutional.46
II. FEDERAL COURTS, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
During the period between the first aerial search case in
1973 and the Supreme Court's ruling on the constitution-
ality of aerial surveillance in Ciraolo, many state and fed-
eral courts addressed the constitutionality of warrantless
aerial observations.47 Their responses varied due to the
lack of specific guidelines from the United States Supreme
Court.48 The courts generally recognized the need for
constitutional standards for warrantless aerial surveillance
situations. 49 The following discussion focuses chronologi-
cally on a few federal court opinions that represent the
various approaches taken by the numerous federal and
state courts confronting this issue.50 These cases shed
light on the factors repeatedly considered by the courts
open field violated reasonable expectations of privacy, the Court enumerated sev-
eral factors it looked to for guidance: 1) the intention of the Framers of the fourth
amendment, see, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977) (no tvi-
dence the Framers intended to exclude from protection of the Warrant Clause all
searches occurring outside the home); Payton, 445 U.S. at 591-98 (consideration
of what the Framers of the amendment might have thought to be reasonable), 2)
the uses to which the individual has put a location, see, e.g.,Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960) (whether an individual merely has "use" of area or is
"domiciled" there), 3) our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion, see, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at
585 (physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
fourth amendment is directed).
4 Note, supra note 21, at 148. If the area searched was located outside the
curtilage, the search was valid per se. If the area searched was within the curtilage,
a reasonable expectation of privacy had to be found to invalidate the search. Id. at
146-47.
41 Comment, supra note 13, at 275.
48 Id. at 259.
49 See generally Comment, supra note 13; Comment, supra note 27; Note, Aerial
Surveillance: Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 271 (1981).
51, For a list of early state court decisions on the validity of aerial surveillance,
see Comment, supra note 27, at 474 n.84. For a discussion of more recent state
court cases dealing with aerial surveillance, see Comment, supra note 13, at 275
n. 134.
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applying the fourth amendment analysis to aerial
observations.
In United States v. DeBacker5 1 the defendant contended
that a warrantless aerial search for marijuana on his farm
in rural Michigan violated his fourth amendment rights.52
This controversy was one of first impression in the federal
courts .
The DeBacker court refused to declare that certain areas
fell completely outside the scope of the fourth amend-
ment.54 Instead, the court, following the rationale in Katz,
reasoned that traditionally an individual could not reason-
ably expect privacy in an open field, especially when low-
altitude flights frequently occurred over the area.55 The
court rejected the defendant's argument that steps taken
to insure privacy from ground level observation resulted
in a reasonable expectation of privacy from the aerial
search.
56
-, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
-1 Id. at 1079. The government countered that the flight occurred over open
fields to which fourth amendment rights do not attach. Id.
53 Id. at 1080. State courts, however, had been debating the constitutionality of
warrantless aerial observations for years. Comment, supra note 13, at 275.
DeBacher, 493 F. Supp. at 1081.
55 Id. In making this determination the court remarked that any pilot or passen-
ger of a commercial or pleasure craft could have spotted the marijuana since low-
altitude flights over farms in that area were not infrequent. Id.
The court also relied on the fact that the police were "in a place they had a right
to be," and from which they could easily observe the defendant's fields. Id. This
frequent justification for upholding the constitutionality of aerial observations
stems from oft-quoted language in Katz emphasizing, "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Justice Harlan expounded on
this point in his concurring opinion stating
Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the
'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, con-
versations in the open would not be protected against being over-
heard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would
be unreasonable.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
.- DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1081. All of the fields were located some distance
from the home, and the defendant had fenced the property and posted signs for-
bidding trespassing. Id. at 1079. The court stated, "Defendant's relatively minor
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Soon after the DeBacker decision, a federal district court
again faced the question whether a warrantless aerial sur-
veillance constituted an unreasonable search in United
States v. Mullinex.5 7 In Mullinex the police arrested the de-
fendant for cultivating marijuana based on evidence ob-
tained during a warrantless police overflight of his farm. 8
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence arguing
that the aerial surveillance violated his reasonable expec-
tation of privacy from such observation.59
The Mullinex court followed the DeBacker analysis and
declared that while open fields were not per se beyond con-
stitutional protection, the defendant's expectation of pri-
vacy in an open field must be an expectation that society
recognizes as reasonable before the fourth amendment
will protect that expectation. 60 Despite the fact that the
defendant's efforts to conceal the marijuana from public
view manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, the
court found that the frequency of airplane flights over the
farm precluded the defendant from maintaining a reason-
able expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance.6'
In United States v. Allen 62 the appellants challenged their
convictions for possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute and for conspiracy to import marijuana, argu-
ing that warrantless Coast Guard overflights of Allen's
expectations of privacy do not outweigh the value to society in permitting such
nonintrusive surveillance." Id. at 1081.
51 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
-58 Id. at 512. The Kentucky State Police conducted the aerial overflight of the
defendant's farm after receiving a tip from an informant who had purchased mari-juana there. Id. The flight over the farm lasted approximately five minutes and at
its lowest point was 200 feet above the farm. Id. at 513.
.- Id. at 512. The United States argued that the open fields doctrine eliminated
the necessity of obtaining a search warrant of the defendant's farm. Id. at 513.
o' Id. at 514. "If the Court finds that the defendant could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area where the seizure was made, in this case an open
field, then he does not have the protection of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
I( d. The defendant's girlfriend testified that planes frequently flew over the
farm. Id. at 513. "What was exposed to police aerial surveillance was also ex-
posed to the public." Id. at 514.
62 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
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oceanside ranch violated the fourth amendment. 63 In Al-
len a United States Customs Bureau officer suspected ap-
pellants of conducting a drug smuggling operation on
Allen's ranch.64 Photos taken of the ranch by the officer
during a Coast Guard overflight revealed large-scale mod-
ifications to the barn and landscape, prompting further
ground level investigation which led to the arrest of the
appellants .65
The appellants sought to establish that they legitimately
expected privacy from aerial surveillance, because the ob-
jects photographed could not be viewed from any ground
level vantage point outside the boundaries of the prop-
erty.66 The court agreed that "a person need not con-
struct an opaque bubble over his or her land in order to
have a reasonable expectation of privacy."' 6 7 However, the
court concluded that the appellants could not maintain
even a subjective expectation of privacy from aerial sur-
veillance for several reasons: the location of the ranch in
an area routinely traversed by Coast Guard helicopters,
the reasonable expectation that government officers con-
ducting the flights would use electronic equipment, and
the large size of the objects observed.68
In United States v. Marbury 69 the Fifth Circuit became the
first federal court to apply Oliver's reaffirmation of the
open fields doctrine to an aerial surveillance situation. In
Marbury officers flew over a large gravel pit owned by one
';3 Id. at 1288. The Allen Ranch ran parallel to the ocean for about one mile but
was separated from the beach by a narrow strip of federal property. Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1286. Allen terminated the previous owner's practice of permitting
local fishermen and hunters to cross the ranch to reach the federal property on
the ocean side. Id. The local residents complained to the local United States Cus-
toms Bureau office. Id. Larry Gano, the officer in charge, conducted a check on
Allen's background which led him to believe Allen was using the ranch for a drug-
smuggling base. Id.
't,' Id. The officer took the photos with a telephoto lens. Id.
t;i Id. at 1289.
67 Id. The court commented that today few unenclosed areas exist which could
not be observed from the air, given the sophisticated electronic photographic de-
vices now available. Id.
Id. at 1290.
732 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1984).
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of the appellants in search of stolen machinery. 70 Uphold-
ing the validity of this warrantless aerial search, the court
found that the open fields doctrine of Oliver authorized
police observations of the plainly noncurtilage portions of
this large tract of land, such as the sand dunes and road-
ways an eighth of a mile from the vehicle shed.7 '
United States v. Bassford 72 involved warrantless aerial po-
lice overflights of separate marijuana plots cultivated by
the two defendants.73 One of the defendants argued that
the aerial surveillance occurred within the curtilage of his
home and was thus unconstitutional per se. 4 However, the
court refused to distinguish between 'curtilage' and
'noncurtilage' areas equally visible from the air.75 Instead
the court limited its inquiry solely to whether the defend-
ants maintained reasonable expectations of privacy from
70 Id. at 393. The officers conducted the aerial search after receiving two tips
that equipment reported stolen was on the defendants' premises. Id.
71 Id. at 398. "Further, even absent the 'open fields' doctrine, aerial surveil-
lance without a warrant of an area such as this large commercial gravel pit tract
does not amount to an unconstitutional search, at least where, as here, it is for the
purpose of verifying a particularized, justifiable belief concerning criminal activity
associated with the premises." Id.
72 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985).
73 Id. at 1326. The police conducted a ground search of the Bassford property
pursuant to a search warrant granted on the basis of the evidence obtained during
the aerial observations and located one plot about ten feet from the Bassford
home and a plot about 100 feet from the house. Id. at 1327. Other plots were
located approximately 370 feet and 450 feet from the dwelling. Id. The officers
believed they were still on Bassford property when they entered a dwelling actu-
ally owned and occupied by Richard Bradley. Id. at 1328. More marijuana plants
were found 200 feet from the Bradley house. Id.
74 Id. at 1331. Bassford argued that Oliver supported the proposition that the
warrantless aerial search of an area within the curtilage of the home was per se
unconstitutional. Id. at 1328. The court replied that Oliver did not delineate the
scope of the curtilage exception to the open fields doctrine. Id. at 1329. Oliver did
not speak to the propriety of aerial surveillance of areas located within the curti-
lage but easily viewed from the air. Id.
I5 d. at 1331. The court reasoned that only physical intrusions into the curti-
lage typically violated the fourth amendment. Id. Observations of areas within
the curtilage from outside ground locations were generally permissible. Id.
"Under the same reasoning and assuming that aerial surveillance of the particular
place is lawful, there would appear to be no sound reason for distinguishing be-
tween 'curtilage' and 'noncurtilage' areas equally visible from the air. In most
cases it would be impracticable to view one without contemporaneously viewing
the other." Id.
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aerial surveillance of the areas, whether curtilage or
noncurtilage.76
The Bassford court reviewed prior cases involving the
fourth amendment problems created by aerial surveil-
lance and enumerated several factors it found important
in determining if a reasonable expectation of privacy from
aerial observation existed:77 1) the altitude of the air-
craft, 7s 2) the size of the objects observed, 79 3) the nature
and use of the area observed, s0 4) the frequency of flights
over the area,8 ' 5) and the frequency and duration of the
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1330. "Rather than embracing a general rule courts have taken a case-
by-case approach to the fourth amendment problems implicated by aerial surveil-
lance." Id.
78 See Dow Chem. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1827 (taking of aerial photographs from
"navigable airspace" does not violate the fourth amendment); DeBacker, 493 F.
Supp. at 1081 (frequent low-altitude flights (200 feet) over the area reduced pri-
vacy expectations); People v. Lashmett, 71 Il. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888, 890
(1979)(aerial surveillance from an altitude of 2400 feet did not constitute a
search), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); Burkholder v. Superior Court of Santa
Cruz, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1979)(aerial observation from
lawful altitude (1500 to 2000 feet) is not unreasonable); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw.
412, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327 (1977)(that police helicopter flew at a lawful and rea-
sonable height was a factor to consider in determining the "reasonableness" of
the privacy expectation; unreasonably low helicopter surveillance might be uncon-
stitutional); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151
(1973)(the defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy from surveillance at
twenty to twenty-five feet, but not legitimate expectation of privacy from observa-
tion at "legal and reasonable heights").
79 See Allen, 633 F.2d at 1289 (large-scale modifications of buildings and land-
scape); Lashmett, 71 111. App. 3d at 431, 389 N.E.2d at 890 (farm machinery); Peo-
ple v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. App. 3d 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764,
765 (1974)(conspicuous and identifiable automobile hood); Dean v. Superior
Court of Nevada, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973)(one who
established a three-quarter-acre tract of cultivated marijuana exhibited no reason-
able expectation of privacy from overflights).
80 See People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 890, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190
(1980) (the individual seeking constitutional safeguards must show that the land is
used in accordance with the common habits of peoples engaged in the cultivation
of agricultural land who exhibit an expectation of privacy with respect to the pur-
suit in question); Burkholder, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 423, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (the
owner of land upon which marijuana is grown can exhibit no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from an overflight consistent with the common habits of persons
engaged in agrarian pursuits); Dean, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589
(the need for secrecy surrounding cultivated marijuana is not consistent with the
common habits of mankind in the use of agriculture and woodland areas).
s, See Allen, 633 F.2d at 1290 (Coast Guard helicopters routinely traversed the
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aerial surveillance. s2 In upholding the constitutionality of
the overflights, the court concluded that the frequency of
flights over the area, the distinctively different coloration
of the marijuana on a mountainside where farming would
not be expected, and the brevity of the surveillance were
factors militating against a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy from aerial observation.8 3
After the Bassford court rejected the distinction between
'curtilage' and 'open fields' in the aerial surveillance con-
text, a federal district court reemphasized the importance
of the curtilage doctrine in National Organization for the
Reform of the Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen.84 In
NORML the plaintiffs instituted a class action against vari-
ous state and federal officials and agencies involved in
California's Campaign Against Marijuana Planting
(CAMP).8" The plaintiffs complained about intrusive and
dangerous CAMP helicopter activities, and many alleged
sustained and repeated low-level "buzzings" and "dive-
bombings" of their homes.86
area); Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. at 514 (airplane flights over farm were not unusual);
Stachler, 58 Haw. at 417, 570 P.2d at 1328 (daily flights over area); Superior Court of
Los Angeles, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765 (patrol by police helicop-
ter was common).
82 See Allen, 633 F.2d at 1289 (extensive police surveillance did not violate rea-
sonable expectation of privacy); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 957 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (regular disruptive
and intrusive low level helicopter surveillance violated reasonable expectations of
privacy); DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1081 (police did not regularly view the defend-
ant's property for criminal activity; aerial observation was a nonintrusive isolated
event); Stachler, 58 Haw. at 417, 570 P.2d at 1328 (prolonged aerial surveillance
lasting hours or days would likely be unconstitutional).
Bassford, 601 F. Supp. at 1331.
Although Bassford may well have hoped that planes passing over-
head would be occupied by persons uninterested in his unusual
farming location and his distinctive crop, he could not reasonably
expect that others, such as the police, would not fly over and take
note. All of the plots in the Bassford property, including plot # 1,
which was about ten feet from the house, were clearly and contem-
poraneously visible from the same vantage point.
Id. at 1332.
608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
"I ld. at 949. CAMP was a sophisticated law enforcement program that used
airplanes and helicopters to locate cultivated marijuana plots. Id.
- Id. at 955. The plaintiffs gave numerous accounts of disruptive and intrusive
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Unlike the court in Bassford, the NORML court began its
analysis by distinguishing between an aerial observation
of the curtilage and one of the open fields.8 7 The court
first acknowledged that the open fields doctrine of Oliver
left no doubt that CAMP personnel could constitutionally
use aircraft to locate marijuana in open fields.8 8 The
court then stated that the fourth amendment did place
limitations on CAMP's ability to use its air power to
search homes or the curtilage.89 The court emphasized
that the CAMP helicopters deliberately looked into and
invaded peoples' homes and curtilage. 90
The court found that the plaintiffs sustained a reason-
able expectation of privacy from this kind of aerial intru-
sion by weighing factors similar to those considered in
Bassford.91 First, CAMP did not limit its observations to an
"occasional, casual peek," but instead engaged in sus-
tained and repeated buzzings, hoverings, and dive-bomb-
ings.92  Second, the low-level helicopter flights violated
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations estab-
lishing minimum altitude limits for helicopters.93 The
court declared that any helicopter surveillance conducted
in violation of FAA safety regulations created a presump-
helicopter surveillance by CAMP personnel. For example, one man testified that a
helicopter hovered and watched him use his outdoor toilet. Id. Richard Moller
and Susan McManus described how a helicopter hovered so the occupants could
see inside the plaintiffs' homes. Id. Allison Osborne reported that the CAMP heli-
copters flew so closely she could see the facial features of the pilot in detail. Id. at
955-56. Other plaintiffs testified that helicopters made several low-altitude passes
over their homes. Id. at 956.
87 Id.
- Id. at 957.
til Id. "When CAMP uses its air power to pry into or enter private homes or
their curtilage, however, the fourth amendment comes into play."
sm) Id. The uncontradicted evidence established CAMP made regular intrusions
into the areas immediately surrounding the plaintiffs' homes. Id.
!,I See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors
considered in Bassford.
92NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 957.
w. Id. at 957-58, 965-66. 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(c) provides that in noncongested
areas, an aircraft may not be operated below "[an altitude of 500 feet above the
surface except over water or sparsely populated areas." 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(c)
(1985). In sparsely populated areas, "the aircraft may not be operated closer than
500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure." Id.
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tively unreasonable search. 04 Finally, the court objected
to the random nature of the airborne observations.9 5 The
court enjoined the defendants from using helicopters for
general surveillance purposes except over open fields.96
The federal district court in United States v. Broadhurst 97
interpreted the open fields doctrine in an unprecedented
manner. In Broadhurst several defendants moved to sup-
press evidence obtained from a warrantless aerial patrol
of their greenhouse in which police had suspected the de-
fendants cultivated marijuana.9 8 The officers flew in cir-
cles around the greenhouse at an altitude of one thousand
feet, viewing its contents from different angles.9 9 The
court concluded that the greenhouse was situated in the
open fields."'0 However, the court refused to apply the
open fields doctrine because the officers conducting the
surveillance did not intend to observe the open fields sur-
rounding the defendants' dwelling, but sought solely to
observe the contents of the enclosed structure on the
land. 0 1
The court found that the defendants maintained a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy from this type of aerial sur-
veillance, even though an airport was located nearby. 0 2
94 NORML, 608 F. Supp. at 965.
'" Id. at 958.
-, Id. at 965.
91 612 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
im Id. at 781. The police conducted the search after a citizen informed them
that he had seen marijuana in the greenhouse while deer hunting. Id. at 780.
'i' Id. at 782. The police actually conducted three overflights. Id. at 781.
' Id. at 787. The distance of the greenhouse from the dwelling led the court
to dismiss the argument that the greenhouse was within the curtilage of the home
and thus within the shelter of the fourth amendment. The greenhouse was sepa-
rated from the residence by approximately 375 feet of steep, hilly terrain. Id. The
court could find no case extending the curtilage principle to an area so far away
from the home. Id. Also, the greenhouse was not within the fenced area sur-
rounding the dwelling. Id. at 789.
,,, Id. at 787. The court found nothing in the Oliver opinion to suggest that the
open fields doctrine applied to a structure used to grow agricultural products lo-
cated in an open field. Id. "While this fact alone does not necessarily require a
conclusion that defendants' asserted privacy interest was reasonable, it does
render inapplicable the virtually per se rule excluding open fields from the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
.... Id. at 792, 794-95.
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In so holding, the court emphasized that the defendants
could not reasonably expect aircraft to circle above the
greenhouse and employ special maneuvers to observe the
marijuana inside.10 3 The defendants had taken every pre-
caution to ensure privacy fiom ground level observation
including erecting fences, posting no trespassing signs,
and using specially-tinted siding and roofing for the
greenhouse. 0 4 Because of these extraordinary measures,
the court rejected the government's argument that no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy existed because the mari-
juana was plainly visible from a place where the officers
had a right to be.10 5 In support of its holding, the court
stated that it found no cases
which hold that a person, in order to protect himself from
the unwelcome eye of the general public or law enforce-
ment, must lock himself away so tightly, and so completely
as to preclude any clever or technologically endowed
eavesdropper from viewing his activities from any angle.
The fourth amendment does not set up a contest between
government and private citizen to test which party can
outmaneuver the other in a game of hide and seek. 10 6
The Supreme Court recently considered the constitu-
tionality of a warrantless aerial surveillance of an indus-
trial complex in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,'0 7 a
companion case to California v. Ciraolo. In Dow Chemical
the EPA employed an aerial photographer to take photo-
graphs inside Dow's two-thousand-acre chemical plant us-
103 Id.
The Court recognizes that while a reasonable person might assume
some form of privacy invasion from so-called curious aerial pass-
ersby .... such a momentary invasion of privacy does not equate to
the directed aerial search exhibited in this case. Citizens, whether
rural or otherwise, should not have to anticipate low flying and/or
circling reconnaissance missions in order to protect their reasonable
privacy expectations.
Id. at 794.
-, Id. at 785.
t, Id. at 795. The court found that the officers had no right to be where they
were while conducting the search. Id.
,", Id. at 792.
107 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
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ing an aerial mapping camera from navigable airspace.10 8
Dow claimed that the EPA's use of aerial photography
took place within the "industrial curtilage" rather than an
open field, and thus violated Dow's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from such surveillance.' 0 9 The Court re-
jected the concept of "industrial curtilage" as inconsistent
with the strict definition of "curtilage." l 0 It reasoned
that the fourth amendment protected the curtilage sur-
rounding the home from warrantless police searches be-
cause of the private family activities occurring there."'
Because such intimate family activities did not occur in
the outdoor areas surrounding the buildings within Dow's
manufacturing plant, those outdoor areas were not analo-
gous to the curtilage of a dwelling." 2 Since an industrial
complex was more comparable to an open field, Dow's ex-
pectations of privacy from aerial observation were not
reasonable, despite Dow's ground level elaborate security
system." 3 The Court denied that its decision required
Dow erect a huge cover over Dow's entire facility to pro-
tect itself from warrantless aerial observation." 14  How-
'os Id. at 1822. The Court noted,
It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of pri-
vate property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment
not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology,
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant. But the pho-
tographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise con-
stitutional concerns.
Id. at 1826-27.
,ol, Id. The EPA had, with Dow's permission, inspected powerplants within the
complex. Id. When Dow denied the EPA's request for a second inspection, the
EPA did not seek a search warrant before resorting to aerial surveillance tech-
niques. Id.
1 Id. The Court in Dow Chemical reaffirmed the oft-quoted definition of"curti-
lage" as "the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanc-




11.4 Id. The Court granted Dow a reasonable expectation of privacy within the
interior of its covered buildings because Dow maintained an elaborate security
system to prevent public exposure from the ground. Id. However, the EPA's ae-
rial observation of the outdoor areas of the manufacturing facility without physical
entry did not constitute a fourth amendment search. Id.
114 Id.
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ever, the Court did find Dow's complete lack of effort to
protect against aerial surveillance important in holding
that Dow did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
from such observation."15
III. CALIFORNIA V. CIRAOLO
In California v. Ciraolo 116 the United States Supreme
Court confronted the constitutionality of a warrantless ae-
rial surveillance of private property for the first time."17
The Court began its review of the lower court's opinion
with a general discussion of its fourth amendment analy-
sis. 1 18 It stated that the basis of the analysis is the two-
part reasonable expectation test introduced in Katz."19
The defendant's subjective expectation of privacy was not
" Id. at 1826 n.4.
Dow did not take any precautions against aerial intrusions, even
though the plant was near an airport and within the pattern of planes
landing and taking off. If elaborate and expensive measures for
ground security show that Dow has an actual expectation of privacy
in ground security, as Dow argues, then taking no measure for aerial
security should say something about its actual privacy expectation in
being free from aerial observation.
Id. (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1984)).
The Supreme Court was not impressed by the fact that Dow investigated all low-
level flights over its complex. It commented that Dow's procedure of keeping
track of the identification numbers of planes flying overhead in order to check on
whether photographs were taken did not constitute a procedure designed to pro-
tect the manufacturing complex from aerial photography. Id.
116 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
17 See Comment, supra note 13, at 258-59 n. 11. The Supreme Court reversed
the California Court of Appeals, which had found that the warrantless aerial po-
lice search of the defendant's backyard violated the fourth amendment. Ciraolo,
106 S. Ct. at 1810. The California Court of Appeals based its decision on two
factors. Id. at 1811. First, because the defendant's backyard was within the curti-
lage of his dwelling and surrounded by an extensive fence, the court concluded
that the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial sur-
veillance. Id. Second, the court found it significant that the flyover did not result
from a routine police patrol, but was undertaken for the particular purpose of
viewing the defendant's backyard. Id. The Supreme Court dismissed this second
rationale as irrelevant and unsubstantiated saying, "[W]e find difficulty under-
standing exactly how respondent's expectations of privacy from aerial observation
might differ when two planes pass overhead at identical altitudes, simply for dif-
ferent purposes." Id. at 1813 n.2.
116 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
Id. "The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has
a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' " Id. (quoting
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at issue,12 so the Supreme Court continued to the second
query of the Katz test, i.e., whether the defendant's sub-
jective expectation was one that society would recognize
as objectively reasonable.' 2' The Court emphasized that
this second inquiry did not focus on whether the individ-
ual took steps to conceal the observed activity, but instead
focused on whether the government's search infringed
upon the personal and societal values protected by the
fourth amendment. 22
The defendant contended that the yard's location
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan,J., concurring)). See supra notes 33-45 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the reasonable expectation test.
120 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811. The State did not challenge the California Court
of Appeals' finding that the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. Id. The Supreme Court remarked that the defendant clearly met the test of
manifesting his own subjective intent to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agri-
cultural pursuits. Id.
It can reasonably be assumed that the 10-foot fence was placed to
conceal the marijuana crop from at least street level views. So far as
the normal sidewalk traffic was concerned, this fence served that
purpose, because respondent 'took normal precautions to maintain
his privacy.'. . . Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants
from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a
truck or a 2-level bus. Whether respondent therefore manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his back-
yard, or whether instead he manifested merely a hope that no one
would observe his unlawful gardening pursuits, is not entirely clear
in these circumstances. Respondent appears to challenge the author-
ity of government to observe his activity from any vantage point or
place if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, and
not the result of a casual, accidental observation.
Id. at 1812. Thus, while the Court agreed that the defendant maintained a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy from ground level observation, it indicated that the




While no single consideration has been regarded as dispositive, 'the
Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Fram-
ers of the Fourth Amendment .... the uses to which the individual
has put a location .... and our societal understanding that certain
areas deserve the scrupulous protection from governmental inva-
sion.' . . . Our decisions have made it clear that this inquiry often
must be decided by 'reference to a place,' . . . and that a home is a
place in which a subjective expectation of privacy virtually always will
be legitimate.
Id. at 1816 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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within the curtilage precluded any governmental aerial
surveillance without a warrant. 23 The Court rejected the
defendant's argument, replying that warrantless police
observations of an area located within the curtilage were
not per se unconstitutional. 24 The aerial observation of
the curtilage was unconstitutional only if the owner main-
tained a reasonable expectation of privacy from such
observation. 25
The defendant further contended that he maintained a
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance
because he had taken measures to restrict ground level
views of his backyard.' 2 6 The Supreme Court concluded,
however, that his expectation of privacy from aerial sur-
veillance was neither reasonable nor an expectation soci-
ety was prepared to honor because his activities were
clearly visible to the officer observing "from a public van-
tage point where he ha[d] a right to be.' 1 27 The Court
123 Id. at 1812. The Court reaffirmed the curtilage doctrine stating, "[t]he pro-
tection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal
privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologi-
cally, where privacy expectations are most heightened." Id. The Court agreed
that the yard was within the curtilage since that area was immediately adjacent to a
home and surrounded by a fence. Id. The dissent stated that this case involved
surveillance of a home itself because the curtilage is considered part of the home
for fourth amendment purposes. Id. at 1816.
124 Id. at 1812.
125 Id.
26 Id. The defendant contended he had done all that could reasonably be ex-
pected to tell the world he wished to maintain privacy without covering his back-
yard. Id. at 1811. "Such covering, he argues, would defeat its purpose as an
outdoor living area; he asserts he has not 'knowingly' exposed himself to aerial
views." Id.
127 Id. at 1812 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983)). The
Court noted that the observation took place within public navigable airspace in a
physically nonintrusive manner. Id. at 1813. In upholding the validity of an
aerial surveillance, many lower federal and state courts have used the rationale
that the area searched was visible to police from a public place where they had a
right to be. See DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1081 (the police were in a place they
otherwise had a right to be); Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. at 514 (what was exposed to
police aerial surveillance was also exposed to the public); People v. St. Amour,
104 Cal. App. 3d 893, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980)(officers were flying at normal
heights and observed marijuana from a place where they had a right to be);
Lashmett, 71111. App. 3d at 431, 389 N.E.2d at 890 (when sheriff observed machin-
ery from the air, he was in a place where he had a right to be and the machinery
was in clear view); Dean, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (fourth
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stated that any member of the public flying in public navi-
gable airspace could have glanced down and observed
everything the officers observed.1 28
Prior to Oliver's reaffirmance of the open fields doctrine,
many lower courts applying the Katz reasonable expecta-
tion test found ground level measures to restrict observa-
tions of an open field inadequate to support a reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance. 91 2  The
Supreme Court went a step further, however, by conclud-
ing that the defendant's ground level measures to prevent
public view of the curtilage of his home did not create
a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance. 30
The dissent contended that the majority's holding
rested solely on the fact that navigable airspace is open to
amendment permits officers to make observations of suspicious activities from a
place where they have a right to be).
The dissent claimed that reliance on this language quoted from Knotts to judge
aerial surveillance constitutional is misplaced. Id. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The activities under surveillance in Knotts took place on public streets, not in pri-
vate homes. Id. In Knotts, the officers were truly observing "from a public vantage
point where they had a right to be." The activity in this case, on the other hand,
occurred within the private area of the curtilage. Therefore, the reasoning in
Knotts was not applicable to the fact situation involved in Ciraolo. Id.
1" Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion." Id. at 1812 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
129 See Allen, 633 F.2d at 1290 (despite posting of "No Trespassing" signs and
efforts to keep public off property, the defendant could not maintain a reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance when the Coast Guard routinely
flew over the area); DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1080-81 (the defendant contended
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy because of the lengths to which he
went to insure privacy; because the defendant planted marijuana in places not
observable from the road does not mean all surveillance of the property is fore-
closed); Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. at 514 (the defendant could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance despite remoteness of farm and
efforts to conceal marijuana from road side view because airplane flights over land
were not unusual); St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 896, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 190 ("The
reasonable expectation to protect the airspace overlying the land .... cannot be
demonstrated by measures taken to defend the land from earthly intrusions (e.g.,
by setting up a road block, trespass signs or by hiding the area or activity from
ground observations)").
1: Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
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all persons for travel in airplanes. 13 ' Justice Powell ar-
gued that the fact that commercial air travelers might ob-
serve activities occurring within uncovered backyards
apparently nullified expectations of privacy even from
purposeful aerial police surveillance of those yards.13 2
Powell contended that this reasoning was incorrect for
two reasons. 33 First, passengers of commercial and pri-
vate flights normally obtain at most a fleeting, anony-
mous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the homes over
which they pass. 134 This type of observation constituted
no real threat to the homeowner's privacy.' 35 A commer-
cial overflight was not analogous to a low altitude police
overflight for the specific purpose of observing a particu-
lar area. 3 6 Second, the rationale that the officer observed
the backyard from a public place "where he ha[d] a right
to be" was flawed. 137 This oft-quoted language upon
which the majority relied originated in United States v.
Knotts.' 38 Knotts involved activities under observation on a
I, d. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun joined Justice Powell in his dissent. Id.
132 Id.
The only possible basis for this holding is a judgment that the risk to
privacy posed by the remote possibility that a private airplane pas-
senger will notice outdoor activities is equivalent to the risk of offi-
cial aerial surveillance. But the Court fails to acknowledge the
qualitative difference between police surveillance and other uses
made of the air space. Members of the public use the air space for
travel, business, or pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activi-
ties taking place within residential yards. Here, police conducted an
overflight at low altitude solely for the purpose of discovering evi-
dence of crime within a private enclave into which they were consti-
tutionally forbidden to intrude at ground level without a warrant.
Id.
14 Id. at 1818.
134 Id.
-.5 Id. The dissent points out that there is little risk, if any, that a passenger on
a plane might actually observe private activities and connect them to particular
people. Id. "It is no accident that, as a matter of common experience, many peo-
ple build fences around their residential areas, but few build roofs over their back-
yards." Id. Thus, people do not "knowingly expose" their yards to the public
simply because they do not build barriers to prevent aerial surveillance. Id.
13.i Id.
137 Id.
'" Id. See supra note 127 for a discussion of Knotts.
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public street, not in a private area such as the curtilage
surrounding the home.13 9  Therefore, the rationale of
Knotts did not apply.140  The dissent concluded that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
yard, and the aerial surveillance undertaken by the police
for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime consti-
tuted a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. ' 4
The dissenting opinion stated that the majority's hold-
ing constituted a significant departure from the reason-
able expectation test developed in Katz for deciding when
a fourth amendment violation has occurred. 42 Justice
Powell implied that the majority had reverted back to the
pre-Katz fourth amendment analysis, which required a
physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area for
a fourth amendment search. 4  Powell admonished
against upholding an aerial observation simply because it
does not involve a physical trespass onto private prop-
erty.' 44 The dissent ended its opinion with a warning that
aerial surveillance, which involves no physical intrusion
on private property, presents "the obnoxious thing in its
mildest and least repulsive form."' 145 The dissent warned
,39 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1818.
140 Id.
14, Id. at 1819. The dissent worried that this surveillance posed "far too serious
a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth
Amendment oversight." Id.
142 Id. at 1814. In Katz the Court found that the presence or absence of a physi-
cal trespass into a given area was irrelevant to the question whether the fourth
amendment had been violated. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. In so holding, the Court
recognized electronic intrusions as well as physical intrusions can defeat reason-
able expectations of privacy. Id. at 360 (Harlan J., concurring). Katz was con-
cerned primarily with the potential for electronic interception of private
communications as a result of advancing technology. Id. at 362.
143 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1815, 1817-19. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the fourth amendment analysis prior to Katz. "Katz an-
nounced a standard under which the occurrence of a search turned not on the
physical position of the police conducting the surveillance, but on whether the
surveillance in question had invaded a constitutionally protected reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy." Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1815.
144 Id. at 1817. "Reliance on the manner of surveillance is directly contrary to
the standard of Katz." Id.
145 Id. at 1819 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885)).
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of the technological advances that enable the police to
conduct surveillance in the home itself without any physi-
cal trespass' 46 Katz was meant to prevent such silent and
unseen invasions of privacy in the home, but the Court
failed to enforce individual privacy rights when it upheld
this aerial surveillance. 14 7
The majority addressed the dissent's accusation that the
Court ignored the fourth amendment analysis announced
in Katz.'14  The Court explained that Justice Harlan's
warnings about electronic surveillance in Katz were not
aimed at simple visual observations from a public place.
149
The Court doubted that Harlan's concern in Katz regard-
ing the impact of future electronic developments upon an
individual's privacy encompassed aircraft. 50 The Court
stated that a man can reasonably expect privacy in his
home, but objects, activities, or statements that he ex-
poses to the plain view of outsiders are not protected by
the fourth amendment. 15 The Court then summarized its
holding:
In an age where private and commercial flight in the pub-
lic airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally pro-
tected from being observed with the naked eye from an
altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amendment simply
does not require the police traveling in the public airways
at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe
what is visible to the naked eye.' 52
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's analysis in Ciraolo provides lower
11 Id. "[Tihe capability now exists for police to conduct intrusive surveillance
without any physical penetration of the walls of homes or other structures that
citizens may believe shelters their privacy." Id. at 1815.
147 Id.
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federal and state courts with workable guidelines and
standards for determining the constitutionality of a war-
rantless aerial surveillance. First, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the applicability of the curtilage and the open
fields doctrines to the aerial surveillance context. 53 In
Dow Chemical, another aerial surveillance case decided in
conjunction with Ciraolo, the Court reiterated simplified
criterion for distinguishing between these two areas. 154 It
observed that "for most homes the boundaries of the cur-
tilage will be clearly marked; and the conception defining
the curtilage-as the area around the home to which the
activity of homelife extends-is a familiar one easily un-
derstood from our daily experience."'' 55 While the Court
did not attempt to define the boundaries of an open field,
it noted that the term 'open fields' includes any unoccu-
pied or undeveloped area without the curtilage. 156
Next, the Court applied a mechanical fourth amend-
ment analysis consisting of a two-part inquiry to deter-
mine if the aerial surveillance was unconstitutional. First,
"Is the area observed located within the curtilage, or is it
in an open field?"' 5 7 If the area searched is within the
open fields, the warrantless observation is apparently
valid per se under Oliver's reaffirmance of the open fields
doctrine. 58 If the area is within the curtilage, however,
the analysis proceeds to the second query. "Does the
owner of the property maintain a reasonable expectation
of privacy from aerial surveillance?"' 5 9 A warrantless ae-
rial surveillance of the curtilage will be invalidated only if
the homeowner is found to have sustained a reasonable
15 See id. at 1812, 1816-17.
, - Dow Chem., 106 S. Ct. at 1826 n.3.
155 Id.
I; Id.
157 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
'15 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the open
fields doctrine of Oliver.
... Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812. "Accepting, as the State does, that this yard and
its crop fall within the curtilage, the question remains whether naked-eye observa-
tion of the curtilage by police from an aircraft of 1,000 feet violates an expectation
of privacy that is reasonable." Id.
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expectation of privacy from such observation. 60 The
Supreme Court's holding indicates that as long as the ac-
tivities observed on the property are clearly visible from
public navigable airspace, no reasonable expectation of
privacy from aerial surveillance can exist despite measures
taken by the homeowner to restrict ground level observa-
tion such as high fences, "No trespassing" signs and re-
mote locations. 16' Apparently nothing short of an actual
covering over the yard will support a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from aerial surveillance. In Dow Chemical
the Supreme Court held Dow had a legitimate expectation
of privacy "within the interior of its covered buildings,"'
' 62
implying that only an actual covering will suffice.
If read broadly, the Court's holding in Ciraolo presents
serious implications for private family activities taking
place in the yard, or curtilage, of the home. The dissent
forecasted:
The feature of such activities that makes them desirable to
citizens living in a free society, namely, the fact that they
occur in the open air and sunlight, is relied on by the
Court as a justification for permitting police to conduct
warrantless surveillance at will .... It would appear that,
after today, families can expect to be free of official sur-
veillance only when they retreat behind the walls of their
homes. 163
An obvious result of the decision in this case is that a
property owner can never expect family activities occur-
ring in his yard to be free from aerial police observation
unless he is willing to literally erect a roof over the yard.
Furthermore, while this case upheld only a naked-eye po-
lice observation of the curtilage, it is clear that a warrant-
less aerial surveillance of the curtilage will almost always
be upheld regardless of the type of surveillance technique
i')Id.
Ci ld. at 1812-13.
162 Dow Chem., 106 S. Ct. at 1825.
1, Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1819 n.10.
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used, because the Court has made it nearly impossible to
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy there.
The dissent also intimated other implications of the
Court's holding. In Ciraolo, the majority did not indicate
that it would uphold a warrantless ground level police
surveillance if the homeowner had taken proper ground
level measures to preclude such observation. The fact
that the dissent does not distinguish between aerial and
ground surveillance in its forecast above, however, indi-
cates that the dissent fears this holding heralds the com-
plete elimination of fourth amendment protection of the
curtilage. Arguably, the majority's narrow application of
the reasonable expectation test to this warrantless aerial
police surveillance of the curtilage may result in the ero-
sion of fourth amendment protection of the curtilage
from warrantless ground level surveillance. The dissent is
predicting that in the future only the home itself will be
afforded protection from warrantless police surveillance.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Ciraolo answered several
questions about the constitutionality of aerial surveillance
and in the process provided some guidelines and stan-
dards to follow in such cases in the future. The Court's
holding has serious implications for family life, however,
the most frightening of which is the possibility that even-
tually private outdoor family activities will not be free
from either warrantless aerial or ground level police sur-
veillance despite measures taken by the homeowner to
protect against such intrusive observation. While the
fourth amendment status of the "house" appears un-
shaken by the ruling in Ciraolo, in the future the "house"
may be the only haven from the prying eyes and ears of
the police.
Laura J. Johnson
